From b389ff2860fcd0657e089304091652bccbb0f4ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:57:58 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 01/83] security: add explicit admin, peer auth and request limit middleware Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/requireAdmin.js | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/requireAdmin.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/requireAdmin.js b/backend/middleware/requireAdmin.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1ddda53 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/requireAdmin.js @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +// Admin authorization must be based on a verified account token, never the shared API key. +module.exports = function requireAdmin(req, res, next) { + const user = req.user; + if (!user || typeof user.userId !== 'string' || !user.userId || user.role !== 'admin') { + return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' }); + } + return next(); +}; From f2a778d7374457d5cf5da0fa5f518b8837c58498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:58:01 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/83] security: add explicit admin, peer auth and request limit middleware Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js b/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34ba2bb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +const crypto = require('node:crypto'); + +const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300; + +function loadPeers() { + let peers; + try { + peers = JSON.parse(process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON || '{}'); + } catch { + throw new Error('FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON must be valid JSON'); + } + if (!peers || Array.isArray(peers) || typeof peers !== 'object') { + throw new Error('FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON must be an object'); + } + return peers; +} + +function requestDigest(req) { + const body = Buffer.isBuffer(req.rawBody) ? req.rawBody : Buffer.alloc(0); + return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex'); +} + +function signaturePayload(req, timestamp) { + const path = (req.originalUrl || req.url).split('?')[0]; + return [timestamp, req.method.toUpperCase(), path, requestDigest(req)].join('.'); +} + +function safeEqualHex(actual, expected) { + if (typeof actual !== 'string' || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/i.test(actual)) return false; + const actualBuffer = Buffer.from(actual, 'hex'); + const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected, 'hex'); + return actualBuffer.length === expectedBuffer.length && + crypto.timingSafeEqual(actualBuffer, expectedBuffer); +} + +function createPeerHeaders({ nodeId, secret, method, path, body = '' }) { + if (!nodeId || !secret) throw new Error('Federation peer credentials are required'); + const timestamp = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)); + const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex'); + const payload = [timestamp, method.toUpperCase(), path.split('?')[0], digest].join('.'); + const signature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex'); + return { + 'x-federation-node-id': nodeId, + 'x-federation-timestamp': timestamp, + 'x-federation-signature': signature + }; +} + +function requireFederationPeer(req, res, next) { + try { + const nodeId = req.get('x-federation-node-id'); + const timestamp = req.get('x-federation-timestamp'); + const signature = req.get('x-federation-signature'); + + if (!nodeId || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}$/.test(nodeId) || + !timestamp || !/^\d{10}$/.test(timestamp)) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authenticated federation peer required' }); + } + + const seconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000); + if (Math.abs(seconds - Number(timestamp)) > MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Federation request timestamp expired' }); + } + + const peers = loadPeers(); + const secret = peers[nodeId]; + if (typeof secret !== 'string' || secret.length < 32) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unknown federation peer' }); + } + + const expected = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret) + .update(signaturePayload(req, timestamp)) + .digest('hex'); + + if (!safeEqualHex(signature, expected)) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid federation signature' }); + } + + // Provenance is assigned only after authenticating the peer credential. + req.federationPeer = Object.freeze({ nodeId }); + return next(); + } catch (error) { + return res.status(503).json({ error: 'Federation authentication is not configured' }); + } +} + +module.exports = { requireFederationPeer, createPeerHeaders }; From 1eb26b8049df7986ebe886f2bceda2a89b3b9b8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:58:05 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/83] security: add explicit admin, peer auth and request limit middleware Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/rateLimit.js | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/rateLimit.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4588d6cc --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); + +function createRequestLimiter({ windowMs = 60 * 1000, limit = 60, message = 'Too many requests' } = {}) { + return rateLimit({ + windowMs, + limit, + standardHeaders: 'draft-8', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => { + const userId = req.user?.userId; + return typeof userId === 'string' && userId + ? 'account:' + userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip); + }, + handler: (_req, res) => res.status(429).json({ error: message }) + }); +} + +module.exports = { + apiRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 120 }), + userWriteRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 20, message: 'Too many user-management requests' }), + locationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 30, message: 'Too many location requests' }), + chatRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 60, message: 'Too many chat requests' }), + streamRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 20, message: 'Too many stream requests' }), + federationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 30, message: 'Too many federation requests' }) +}; From 6e72ca6e671a7b26042541b44e082e49834f37d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:58:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/83] security: enforce user and administrator access boundaries Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/models/user.js | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/models/user.js b/backend/models/user.js index 9f451408..f203c14d 100644 --- a/backend/models/user.js +++ b/backend/models/user.js @@ -1,47 +1,53 @@ -// DynamoDB does not require a schema or model definition like Mongoose. -// Instead, you can use this file to define helper functions for user objects, -// or simply export attribute names for consistency across your codebase. - -const USER_TABLE_NAME = "Users"; +// DynamoDB user record helpers and explicit response contracts. +const USER_TABLE_NAME = 'Users'; function createUserItem({ - id, // You should generate a unique id for each user (e.g., uuid) - username, - email, - phone, - password, - verified = false, - verificationCode, - location, - coordinates, // { lat, long } - locationType, // 'farm' | 'production' | 'delivery' - locationPrivacy = false, - role = "consumer", - reputationScore = 0, + id, username, email, phone, password, verified = false, + verificationCode, location, coordinates, locationType, + locationPrivacy = false, role = 'consumer', reputationScore = 0, reputationWeight = 0 }) { const item = { - id, // Partition key for DynamoDB table - username, - email, - phone, - password, - verified, - location, - locationPrivacy, - role, - reputationScore, - reputationWeight + id, username, email, phone, password, verified, location, + locationPrivacy, role, reputationScore, reputationWeight }; - if (verificationCode !== undefined) item.verificationCode = verificationCode; if (coordinates !== undefined) item.coordinates = coordinates; if (locationType !== undefined) item.locationType = locationType; - return item; } +// Public directory DTO: no contact details, roles, precise location, or auth state. +function sanitizeUserForPublic(user = {}) { + const safe = {}; + for (const field of ['id', 'username', 'locationType', 'reputationScore', 'reputationWeight']) { + if (user[field] !== undefined) safe[field] = user[field]; + } + return safe; +} + +// Authenticated account DTO. Only returned to the account owner at login. +function sanitizeUserForAuth(user = {}) { + const safe = {}; + for (const field of ['id', 'username', 'email', 'phone', 'role', 'verified', 'reputationScore', 'reputationWeight']) { + if (user[field] !== undefined) safe[field] = user[field]; + } + return safe; +} + +// Administrator DTO intentionally excludes credentials, verification codes and exact coordinates. +function sanitizeUserForAdmin(user = {}) { + const safe = {}; + for (const field of ['id', 'username', 'email', 'phone', 'role', 'verified', 'locationType', 'reputationScore', 'reputationWeight', 'createdAt']) { + if (user[field] !== undefined) safe[field] = user[field]; + } + return safe; +} + module.exports = { USER_TABLE_NAME, - createUserItem + createUserItem, + sanitizeUserForPublic, + sanitizeUserForAuth, + sanitizeUserForAdmin }; From 33ff578d21f8bfcb56122b5ba68e0f3ed491b0cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:58:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/83] security: enforce user and administrator access boundaries Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/userRoutes.js | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/userRoutes.js b/backend/routes/userRoutes.js index 18e12fa7..688a68e5 100644 --- a/backend/routes/userRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/userRoutes.js @@ -1,63 +1,95 @@ const express = require('express'); +const { randomUUID } = require('node:crypto'); const bcrypt = require('../utils/bcrypt'); const router = express.Router(); const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); -const { USER_TABLE_NAME, createUserItem } = require('../models/user'); +const { USER_TABLE_NAME, createUserItem, sanitizeUserForPublic } = require('../models/user'); +const requireAdmin = require('../middleware/requireAdmin'); +const { userWriteRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); -// GET /users - fetch all users, omit sensitive data +// GET /users is a public directory, not an account export. router.get('/', async (req, res) => { - const params = { - TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME - }; - - const filters = []; - const values = {}; - if (req.query.role) { - filters.push('role = :role'); - values[':role'] = req.query.role; - } - if (req.query.location) { - filters.push('location = :location'); - values[':location'] = req.query.location; - } - if (filters.length) { - params.FilterExpression = filters.join(' AND '); - params.ExpressionAttributeValues = values; - } - try { + const params = { + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + ProjectionExpression: '#id, username, locationType, reputationScore, reputationWeight', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + }; + if (req.query.locationType) { + params.FilterExpression = 'locationType = :locationType'; + params.ExpressionAttributeValues = { ':locationType': req.query.locationType }; + } const data = await docClient.scan(params).promise(); - const users = (data.Items || []).map(({ password, ...rest }) => rest); - res.json(users); - } catch (err) { + res.json((data.Items || []).map(sanitizeUserForPublic)); + } catch { res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch users' }); } }); -// POST /users - create a new user -router.post('/', async (req, res) => { +// Administrative provisioning only. Public registration remains /api/auth/register. +router.post('/', userWriteRateLimit, requireAdmin, async (req, res) => { try { - const { password, ...rest } = req.body; - const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(password, 10); + const body = req.body || {}; + if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(body, 'id')) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Client-supplied user ids are not allowed' }); + } + + const allowed = ['username', 'email', 'phone', 'password', 'locationType', 'locationPrivacy', 'role']; + const unexpected = Object.keys(body).filter(key => !allowed.includes(key)); + if (unexpected.length) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Unsupported user fields', fields: unexpected }); + } + + const { username, email, phone, password, locationType, locationPrivacy, role } = body; + if (typeof username !== 'string' || !username.trim() || + typeof email !== 'string' || !email.trim() || + typeof password !== 'string' || password.length < 12) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Username, email, and a password of at least 12 characters are required' }); + } + if (locationPrivacy !== undefined && typeof locationPrivacy !== 'boolean') { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'locationPrivacy must be a boolean' }); + } + if (locationType !== undefined && !['farm', 'production', 'delivery'].includes(locationType)) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid locationType' }); + } + if (role !== undefined && !['consumer', 'producer', 'farmer', 'admin'].includes(role)) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid role' }); + } + const item = createUserItem({ - ...rest, - password: hashedPassword, + id: randomUUID(), + username: username.trim(), + email: email.trim().toLowerCase(), + ...(typeof phone === 'string' ? { phone } : {}), + ...(locationType ? { locationType } : {}), + ...(locationPrivacy !== undefined ? { locationPrivacy } : {}), + role: role || 'consumer', + password: await bcrypt.hash(password, 10), verified: false, - reputationScore: 0 + reputationScore: 0, + reputationWeight: 0 + }); + + await docClient.put({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + Item: item, + ConditionExpression: 'attribute_not_exists(#id)', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + }).promise(); + + return res.status(201).json({ + message: 'User created', + user: sanitizeUserForPublic(item) }); - await docClient.put({ TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, Item: item }).promise(); - const { password: _pwd, ...user } = item; - res.status(201).json({ message: 'User created', user }); } catch (err) { - // Log the error for debugging - console.error('Error creating user:', err); - // Provide more specific error information if available + if (err.code === 'ConditionalCheckFailedException') { + return res.status(409).json({ error: 'User already exists' }); + } if (err.code === 'ValidationException') { - return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Validation error', details: err.message }); + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid user data' }); } - res.status(500).json({ error: err.message || 'Failed to create user' }); + return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to create user' }); } }); module.exports = router; - From 982bf9111f55682f0d47ea9ad0ccb1373e354078 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:58:44 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/83] security: enforce user and administrator access boundaries Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/admin.js | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/admin.js b/backend/routes/admin.js index c64e30c2..be52347e 100644 --- a/backend/routes/admin.js +++ b/backend/routes/admin.js @@ -1,30 +1,39 @@ -const express = require("express"); -const docClient = require("../lib/dynamodbClient"); -const { USER_TABLE_NAME } = require("../models/user"); -const { KEY_TABLE_NAME } = require("../models/key"); +const express = require('express'); +const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); +const { USER_TABLE_NAME, sanitizeUserForAdmin } = require('../models/user'); +const { KEY_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/key'); +const requireAdmin = require('../middleware/requireAdmin'); +const { userWriteRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); const router = express.Router(); -// Get all users -router.get("/users", async (req, res) => { - try { - const data = await docClient - .scan({ TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME }) - .promise(); - const users = data.Items.map(({ password, ...rest }) => rest); - res.json(users); - } catch (err) { - res.status(500).json({ error: "Failed to fetch users" }); - } +// Every route in this module requires a verified administrator account token. +router.use(requireAdmin); +router.use(userWriteRateLimit); + +router.get('/users', async (_req, res) => { + try { + const data = await docClient.scan({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + ProjectionExpression: '#id, username, email, phone, #role, verified, locationType, reputationScore, reputationWeight, createdAt', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id', '#role': 'role' } + }).promise(); + res.json((data.Items || []).map(sanitizeUserForAdmin)); + } catch { + res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch users' }); + } }); -// Get key usage logs -router.get("/keys", async (req, res) => { - try { - const { Items: keys = [] } = await docClient.scan({ TableName: KEY_TABLE_NAME }).promise(); - res.json(keys); - } catch (err) { - res.status(500).json({ error: "Failed to fetch keys" }); - } +router.get('/keys', async (_req, res) => { + try { + const { Items: keys = [] } = await docClient.scan({ + TableName: KEY_TABLE_NAME, + ProjectionExpression: '#id, userId, issuedAt, usageCount, expiresAt', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + }).promise(); + res.json(keys); + } catch { + res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch keys' }); + } }); module.exports = router; From 5a98b0350358fb587b3cc06d4465a399f5038212 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:59:01 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 07/83] security: enforce user and administrator access boundaries Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/authRoutes.js | 92 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/authRoutes.js b/backend/routes/authRoutes.js index 9d4411cc..ec2bde7c 100644 --- a/backend/routes/authRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/authRoutes.js @@ -1,54 +1,60 @@ -const express = require("express"); -const bcrypt = require("../utils/bcrypt"); -const jwt = require("../utils/jwt"); -const { USER_TABLE_NAME, createUserItem } = require("../models/user"); +const express = require('express'); +const bcrypt = require('../utils/bcrypt'); +const jwt = require('../utils/jwt'); +const { USER_TABLE_NAME, createUserItem, sanitizeUserForAuth } = require('../models/user'); const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); -const { randomUUID } = require('crypto'); +const { randomUUID } = require('node:crypto'); const router = express.Router(); -try { - require("dotenv").config(); -} catch { /* Environment may be supplied by the process. */ } +try { require('dotenv').config(); } catch { /* Environment may be supplied by the process. */ } -// Test Route to Verify authRoutes -router.get("/test", (req, res) => { - console.log("Test route hit"); - res.status(200).json({ message: "Auth routes are working!" }); -}); +router.get('/test', (_req, res) => res.status(200).json({ message: 'Auth routes are working!' })); -// Register User -router.post("/register", async (req, res) => { - try { - const { username, email, phone, password } = req.body; - const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(password, 10); - const user = createUserItem({ id: randomUUID(), username, email, phone, password: hashedPassword }); - await docClient.put({ TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, Item: user }).promise(); - res.status(201).json({ message: "User registered. Please verify your email/phone." }); - } catch (error) { - res.status(500).json({ error: "Error registering user." }); +router.post('/register', async (req, res) => { + try { + const { username, email, phone, password } = req.body || {}; + if (typeof username !== 'string' || !username.trim() || + typeof email !== 'string' || !email.trim() || + typeof password !== 'string' || password.length < 12) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Username, email, and a password of at least 12 characters are required' }); } + const user = createUserItem({ + id: randomUUID(), username: username.trim(), email: email.trim().toLowerCase(), + ...(typeof phone === 'string' ? { phone } : {}), + password: await bcrypt.hash(password, 10) + }); + await docClient.put({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + Item: user, + ConditionExpression: 'attribute_not_exists(#id)', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + }).promise(); + return res.status(201).json({ message: 'User registered. Please verify your email/phone.' }); + } catch (error) { + if (error.code === 'ConditionalCheckFailedException') return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Account could not be created' }); + return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Error registering user.' }); + } }); -// Login User -router.post("/login", async (req, res) => { - try { - const { email, password } = req.body; - const { Items = [] } = await docClient.scan({ - TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, - FilterExpression: 'email = :email', - ExpressionAttributeValues: { ':email': email }, - }).promise(); - const user = Items[0]; - - if (!user || !(await bcrypt.compare(password, user.password))) { - return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid credentials" }); - } - - const token = jwt.sign({ userId: user.id, role: user.role }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: "7d" }); - const { password: _password, ...publicUser } = user; - res.json({ token, user: publicUser }); - } catch (error) { - res.status(500).json({ error: "Login error." }); +router.post('/login', async (req, res) => { + try { + const { email, password } = req.body || {}; + if (typeof email !== 'string' || typeof password !== 'string') { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Email and password are required' }); + } + const { Items = [] } = await docClient.scan({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + FilterExpression: 'email = :email', + ExpressionAttributeValues: { ':email': email.trim().toLowerCase() } + }).promise(); + const user = Items[0]; + if (!user || !(await bcrypt.compare(password, user.password))) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid credentials' }); } + const token = jwt.sign({ userId: user.id, role: user.role }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '7d' }); + return res.json({ token, user: sanitizeUserForAuth(user) }); + } catch { + return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Login error.' }); + } }); module.exports = router; From 4d5b99088e72f792d685ee38ef10b4bfba617dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 10:59:40 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 08/83] security: authenticate federation peers and prevent user record overwrite Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/sync/importHelper.js | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/sync/importHelper.js b/backend/sync/importHelper.js index 82c797c4..04df5769 100644 --- a/backend/sync/importHelper.js +++ b/backend/sync/importHelper.js @@ -3,7 +3,39 @@ const { LISTING_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/listing'); const { TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/transaction'); const { USER_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/user'); -async function importFederatedData(data) { +function sanitizeImportedUser(user, sourceNodeId) { + if (!user || typeof user !== 'object' || Array.isArray(user)) { + throw new Error('Invalid user entry in federated import'); + } + if (typeof user.id !== 'string' || !user.id.trim()) { + throw new Error('Federated user must have a remote user id'); + } + if (typeof user.username !== 'string' || !user.username.trim()) { + throw new Error('Federated user must have a username'); + } + if (!sourceNodeId || typeof sourceNodeId !== 'string') { + throw new Error('Authenticated federation source identity is required'); + } + + // Never spread an untrusted remote object into a local account record. + // Role, password, contact details, verification state and unknown fields are omitted. + return { + id: user.id, + username: user.username, + ...(Number.isFinite(user.reputationScore) ? { reputationScore: user.reputationScore } : {}), + ...(Number.isFinite(user.reputationWeight) ? { reputationWeight: user.reputationWeight } : {}), + sourceNodeId, // Set from verified peer authentication, not request JSON. + remoteUserId: user.id, // Explicit identity at the authenticated remote node. + originNodeId: typeof user.originNodeId === 'string' ? user.originNodeId : sourceNodeId, + originUserId: typeof user.originUserId === 'string' ? user.originUserId : user.id + }; +} + +async function importFederatedData(data, { sourceNodeId } = {}) { + if (!data || typeof data !== 'object' || Array.isArray(data)) { + throw new Error('Federation payload must be an object'); + } + for (const listing of data.listings || []) { await docClient.put({ TableName: LISTING_TABLE_NAME, Item: listing }).promise(); } @@ -11,9 +43,15 @@ async function importFederatedData(data) { await docClient.put({ TableName: TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME, Item: transaction }).promise(); } for (const user of data.users || []) { - await docClient.put({ TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, Item: user }).promise(); + const item = sanitizeImportedUser(user, sourceNodeId); + await docClient.put({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + Item: item, + ConditionExpression: 'attribute_not_exists(#id)', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + }).promise(); } return { success: true }; } -module.exports = { importFederatedData }; +module.exports = { importFederatedData, sanitizeImportedUser }; From 6db7ea9d11dbd9c3f55fb6cf79a4a99cb08b81ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:00:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 09/83] security: authenticate federation peers and prevent user record overwrite Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationRoutes.js | 68 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js index 48506004..80c97198 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js @@ -5,31 +5,63 @@ const { LISTING_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/listing'); const { TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/transaction'); const { USER_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/user'); const { importFederatedData } = require('../sync/importHelper'); +const { requireFederationPeer } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); +const { federationRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); -// Export route for peer sync -router.get('/export', async (req, res) => { +const pick = (item, fields) => Object.fromEntries( + fields.filter(field => item[field] !== undefined).map(field => [field, item[field]]) +); + +// Browser API keys and ordinary member tokens are never federation credentials. +router.use(federationRateLimit, requireFederationPeer); + +router.get('/export', async (_req, res) => { try { - const listingsRes = await docClient.scan({ TableName: LISTING_TABLE_NAME }).promise(); - const transactionsRes = await docClient.scan({ TableName: TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME }).promise(); - const usersRes = await docClient.scan({ TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME }).promise(); - res.json({ - listings: listingsRes.Items || [], - transactions: transactionsRes.Items || [], - users: usersRes.Items || [] - }); - } catch (err) { - res.status(500).json({ error: 'Export failed' }); + const [listingsRes, transactionsRes, usersRes] = await Promise.all([ + docClient.scan({ TableName: LISTING_TABLE_NAME }).promise(), + docClient.scan({ TableName: TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME }).promise(), + docClient.scan({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + ProjectionExpression: '#id, username, reputationScore, reputationWeight, originNodeId, originUserId', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + }).promise() + ]); + + const nodeId = process.env.NODE_ID; + const users = (usersRes.Items || []).map(user => ({ + ...pick(user, ['id', 'username', 'reputationScore', 'reputationWeight']), + originNodeId: typeof user.originNodeId === 'string' ? user.originNodeId : nodeId, + originUserId: typeof user.originUserId === 'string' ? user.originUserId : user.id + })); + + // Export only fields required for federation; never serialize full DynamoDB rows. + const listings = (listingsRes.Items || []).map(item => pick(item, [ + 'id', 'userId', 'type', 'title', 'description', 'price', 'location', 'createdAt' + ])); + const transactions = (transactionsRes.Items || []).map(item => pick(item, [ + 'id', 'contractId', 'consumerId', 'producerId', 'rating', 'status' + ])); + + return res.json({ listings, transactions, users }); + } catch { + return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Export failed' }); } }); -// Import route for federation sync router.post('/import', async (req, res) => { try { - await importFederatedData(req.body); - - res.json({ message: 'Import successful' }); - } catch (err) { - res.status(500).json({ error: 'Import failed' }); + await importFederatedData(req.body, { sourceNodeId: req.federationPeer.nodeId }); + return res.json({ message: 'Import successful' }); + } catch (error) { + if (error.code === 'ConditionalCheckFailedException') { + return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Import refused: user id already exists' }); + } + if (error.message === 'Federated user must have a remote user id' || + error.message === 'Federated user must have a username' || + error.message === 'Federation payload must be an object') { + return res.status(400).json({ error: error.message }); + } + return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Import failed' }); } }); From 395beea21237cf2c729ac157ed90d42f9f8920f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:00:42 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 10/83] security: authenticate federation peers and prevent user record overwrite Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js | 78 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js index 1ffca6c5..33e056ae 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js @@ -1,50 +1,56 @@ -const axios = require("axios"); -const dynamodbClient = require("../lib/dynamodbClient"); -const { NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME } = require("./models/nodeRegistry"); +const axios = require('axios'); +const dynamodbClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); +const { NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME } = require('./models/nodeRegistry'); +const { createPeerHeaders } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); -const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL || "http://localhost:5000"; +const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL || 'http://localhost:5000'; const runFederationSync = async () => { - // Scan all nodes from DynamoDB table - const { Items: nodes } = await dynamodbClient + const nodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID; + const secret = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET; + if (!nodeId || !secret || secret.length < 32) { + console.error('Federation sync skipped: local peer credentials are not configured'); + return; + } + + const { Items: nodes = [] } = await dynamodbClient .scan({ TableName: NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME }) .promise(); -/* -const { getAllNodes, saveNode } = require("./models/nodeRegistry"); -const runFederationSync = async () => { - const nodes = await getAllNodes(); -*/ for (const node of nodes) { try { - // Fetch federation/export data from the node - const { data } = await axios.get(`${node.url}/federation/export`); - - // Update lastSyncAt in DynamoDB for this node - await axios.post(`${BACKEND_URL}/import`, data); - - await dynamodbClient - .update({ - TableName: NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME, - Key: { url: node.url }, - UpdateExpression: "set lastSyncAt = :time", - ExpressionAttributeValues: { - ":time": new Date().toISOString(), - }, - }) - .promise(); - - //node.lastSyncAt = new Date().toISOString(); - //await saveNode(node); - - console.log(`✅ Synced with ${node.url}`); - } catch (err) { - console.error(`❌ Failed to sync with ${node.url}`); + const exportPath = '/federation/export'; + const exportHeaders = createPeerHeaders({ nodeId, secret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath }); + const { data } = await axios.get(new URL(exportPath, node.url).toString(), { + headers: exportHeaders, + timeout: 15000 + }); + + const importPath = '/federation/import'; + const body = JSON.stringify(data); + const importHeaders = createPeerHeaders({ + nodeId, secret, method: 'POST', path: importPath, body + }); + await axios.post(new URL(importPath, BACKEND_URL).toString(), body, { + headers: { ...importHeaders, 'content-type': 'application/json' }, + timeout: 30000 + }); + + await dynamodbClient.update({ + TableName: NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME, + Key: { url: node.url }, + UpdateExpression: 'set lastSyncAt = :time', + ExpressionAttributeValues: { ':time': new Date().toISOString() } + }).promise(); + console.log('Federation sync completed with configured peer'); + } catch (error) { + console.error('Federation sync failed for a registered peer:', error.message); } } }; -// Run every 6 hours -setInterval(runFederationSync, 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // 6 hours +// Run every six hours. server.js may invoke the first run at startup. +const timer = setInterval(runFederationSync, 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000); +if (typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref(); module.exports = runFederationSync; From 9b2107c9a4698cb5c246811458333a36ff735287 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:02:42 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 11/83] security: fail closed on unauthenticated streams and apply request limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 183 +++++++--------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 157 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index 7a827381..b8bf5e75 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -1,173 +1,42 @@ const express = require("express"); const http = require('http'); let cors; -try { - cors = require("cors"); -} catch { - cors = () => (_req, _res, next) => next(); -} +try { cors = require('cors'); } catch { cors = () => (_req, _res, next) => next(); } let dotenv; -try { - dotenv = require("dotenv"); -} catch { - dotenv = { config: () => {} }; -} -const path = require("path"); -const authMiddleware = require("./middleware/authMiddleware"); - -// Load environment variables +try { dotenv = require('dotenv'); } catch { dotenv = { config: () => {} }; } +const path = require('path'); +const authMiddleware = require('./middleware/authMiddleware'); +const { apiRateLimit, chatRateLimit, streamRateLimit, locationRateLimit } = require('./middleware/rateLimit'); dotenv.config(); - const minimal = process.env.MINIMAL_SERVER === 'true'; - const app = express(); - -// --- PRODUCTION-READY CORS RESTRICTION --- -const allowedOrigins = ['https://www.ntari.org']; -app.use(cors({ - origin: function (origin, callback) { - if (!origin || allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) { - callback(null, true); - } else { - callback(new Error('CORS not allowed for this origin')); - } - }, - credentials: true, - methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'OPTIONS'], - allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization', 'Idempotency-Key'] -})); -// ----------------------------------------- - -app.use(express.json()); -const tryMount = (route, modPath) => { - try { - const mod = require(modPath); - app.use(route, mod); - } catch (err) { - console.warn(`Skipping ${modPath}: ${err.message}`); - } -}; - -if (!minimal) { - tryMount("/deposit", "./routes/depositRoutes"); -} - -// Health Check Endpoint -app.get('/health', (req, res) => { - res.status(200).send('OK'); -}); - -// Server & SSE event stream +const allowedOrigins = (process.env.CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS || 'https://www.ntari.org').split(',').map(origin => origin.trim()).filter(Boolean); +app.use(cors({ origin(origin, callback) { if (!origin || allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) return callback(null, true); return callback(new Error('CORS not allowed for this origin')); }, credentials: true, methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'OPTIONS'], allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization', 'Idempotency-Key', 'X-Federation-Node-Id', 'X-Federation-Timestamp', 'X-Federation-Signature'] })); +app.use(express.json({ verify(req, _res, buffer) { req.rawBody = Buffer.from(buffer); } })); +const tryMount = (route, modPath) => { try { app.use(route, require(modPath)); } catch (err) { console.warn('Skipping ' + modPath + ': ' + err.message); } }; +if (!minimal) tryMount('/deposit', './routes/depositRoutes'); +app.get('/health', (_req, res) => res.status(200).send('OK')); const server = http.createServer(app); - -// Simple Server-Sent Events implementation -const sseClients = new Set(); -// Map of conversationId -> Set of response objects +// Fail closed until owner-authenticated streaming (#192) is merged. +app.get('/events', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Global event stream retired; use authenticated conversation streams' })); +app.get('/stream/:conversationId', streamRateLimit, (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Conversation streaming is temporarily unavailable pending owner-authenticated stream support' })); const conversationStreams = new Map(); - -app.get('/events', (req, res) => { - res.writeHead(200, { - 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', - 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache', - Connection: 'keep-alive' - }); - sseClients.add(res); - req.on('close', () => sseClients.delete(res)); -}); - -// Unified conversation-scoped Server-Sent Events endpoint -app.get('/stream/:conversationId', (req, res) => { - const { conversationId } = req.params; - res.writeHead(200, { - 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', - 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache', - Connection: 'keep-alive' - }); - - if (!conversationStreams.has(conversationId)) { - conversationStreams.set(conversationId, new Set()); - } - - const clients = conversationStreams.get(conversationId); - clients.add(res); - - req.on('close', () => { - clients.delete(res); - if (clients.size === 0) { - conversationStreams.delete(conversationId); - } - }); -}); - -function sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data) { - const clients = conversationStreams.get(conversationId); - if (!clients) return; - const payload = `event: ${event}\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(data)}\n\n`; - clients.forEach(res => res.write(payload)); -} - -function broadcast(event, data, conversationId) { - if (conversationId) { - sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data); - return; - } - const payload = `event: ${event}\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(data)}\n\n`; - sseClients.forEach(res => res.write(payload)); -} +function sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data) { const clients = conversationStreams.get(conversationId); if (!clients) return; const payload = 'event: ' + event + '\\ndata: ' + JSON.stringify(data) + '\\n\\n'; clients.forEach(res => res.write(payload)); } +function broadcast(event, data, conversationId) { if (conversationId) sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data); } global.broadcast = broadcast; - -// Helpers to emit token and message events -function emitToken(conversationId, id, token) { - sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'token', { id, token }); -} - -function emitMessage(conversationId, message) { - sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'message', { message }); -} - -global.emitToken = emitToken; -global.emitMessage = emitMessage; - -// Middleware +global.emitToken = (conversationId, id, token) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'token', { id, token }); +global.emitMessage = (conversationId, message) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'message', { message }); app.use(authMiddleware); -app.use('/uploads', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'uploads'))); - -// Routes +app.use(apiRateLimit); +app.use('/uploads', apiRateLimit, express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'uploads'))); +app.use('/conversations', chatRateLimit); +app.use('/messages', chatRateLimit); +app.use('/api/location', locationRateLimit); let runFederationSync; if (!minimal) { - [ - ['/', './routes/api'], - ['/api/auth', './routes/authRoutes'], - ['/api/keys', './routes/keyRoutes'], - ['/api/contracts', './routes/contracts'], - ['/api/admin', './routes/admin'], - ['/api/marketplace', './marketplace/marketplace_routes'], - ['/users', './routes/userRoutes'], - ['/products', './routes/products'], - ['/broadcast', './routes/broadcastRoutes'], - ['/sms', './routes/smsRoutes'], - ['/cart', './routes/cartRoutes'], - ['/orders', './routes/orderRoutes'], - ['/subscriptions', './routes/subscriptionRoutes'], - ['/conversations', './routes/conversationRoutes'], - ['/messages', './routes/communicationRoutes'], - ['/inventory', './routes/inventoryRoutes'], - ['/api/location', './routes/locationRoutes'], - ['/federation', './federation/federationRoutes'], - ['/trends', './trends/trendsRoutes'], - ].forEach(([route, mod]) => tryMount(route, mod)); - - try { - runFederationSync = require('./federation/federationSyncJob'); - } catch (err) { - console.warn(`Federation sync disabled: ${err.message}`); - } + [['/', './routes/api'], ['/api/auth', './routes/authRoutes'], ['/api/keys', './routes/keyRoutes'], ['/api/contracts', './routes/contracts'], ['/api/admin', './routes/admin'], ['/api/marketplace', './marketplace/marketplace_routes'], ['/users', './routes/userRoutes'], ['/products', './routes/products'], ['/broadcast', './routes/broadcastRoutes'], ['/sms', './routes/smsRoutes'], ['/cart', './routes/cartRoutes'], ['/orders', './routes/orderRoutes'], ['/subscriptions', './routes/subscriptionRoutes'], ['/conversations', './routes/conversationRoutes'], ['/messages', './routes/communicationRoutes'], ['/inventory', './routes/inventoryRoutes'], ['/api/location', './routes/locationRoutes'], ['/federation', './federation/federationRoutes'], ['/trends', './trends/trendsRoutes']].forEach(([route, mod]) => tryMount(route, mod)); + try { runFederationSync = require('./federation/federationSyncJob'); } catch (err) { console.warn('Federation sync disabled: ' + err.message); } } - const PORT = process.env.PORT || 5000; -if (require.main === module) { - server.listen(PORT, () => console.log(`Server running on port ${PORT}`)); - if (runFederationSync) runFederationSync(); // kicks off first run when available -} - +if (require.main === module) { server.listen(PORT, () => console.log('Server running on port ' + PORT)); if (runFederationSync) runFederationSync(); } module.exports = { app, server }; From 3ec6f33bd717c9e48236e539abe06d2e445574bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:02:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 12/83] build: add express-rate-limit dependency Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/package.json | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/backend/package.json b/backend/package.json index 0e1551e8..ba7c7356 100644 --- a/backend/package.json +++ b/backend/package.json @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ "cors": "^2.8.5", "dotenv": "^16.4.7", "express": "^4.21.2", + "express-rate-limit": "^8.7.2", "franc": "^6.1.0", "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.2", "openai": "^4.76.0", From 9eb467c2dd896fd1057a7e44d541422b521cfea3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:02:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 13/83] build: lock express-rate-limit dependency Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/package-lock.json | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+) diff --git a/backend/package-lock.json b/backend/package-lock.json index f066c735..71cdb57a 100644 --- a/backend/package-lock.json +++ b/backend/package-lock.json @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ "cors": "^2.8.5", "dotenv": "^16.4.7", "express": "^4.21.2", + "express-rate-limit": "^8.7.2", "franc": "^6.1.0", "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.2", "openai": "^4.76.0", @@ -3662,6 +3663,48 @@ "url": "https://opencollective.com/express" } }, + "node_modules/express-rate-limit": { + "version": "8.7.2", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/express-rate-limit/-/express-rate-limit-8.7.2.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-U1ScocxDD9WI09LaBVypvNkOtNR5yWAmZLkuKJdAzIchA4YKFYF6GT5IKER7epG58oXtjvGlV0/6ii0F83EyZg==", + "license": "MIT", + "dependencies": { + "debug": "^4.4.3", + "ip-address": "^10.2.0" + }, + "engines": { + "node": ">= 16" + }, + "funding": { + "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/express-rate-limit" + }, + "peerDependencies": { + "express": ">= 4.11" + } + }, + "node_modules/express-rate-limit/node_modules/debug": { + "version": "4.4.3", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/debug/-/debug-4.4.3.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-RGwwWnwQvkVfavKVt22FGLw+xYSdzARwm0ru6DhTVA3umU5hZc28V3kO4stgYryrTlLpuvgI9GiijltAjNbcqA==", + "license": "MIT", + "dependencies": { + "ms": "^2.1.3" + }, + "engines": { + "node": ">=6.0" + }, + "peerDependenciesMeta": { + "supports-color": { + "optional": true + } + } + }, + "node_modules/express-rate-limit/node_modules/ms": { + "version": "2.1.3", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ms/-/ms-2.1.3.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-6FlzubTLZG3J2a/NVCAleEhjzq5oxgHyaCU9yYXvcLsvoVaHJq/s5xXI6/XXP6tz7R9xAOtHnSO/tXtF3WRTlA==", + "license": "MIT" + }, "node_modules/fast-json-stable-stringify": { "version": "2.1.0", "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-json-stable-stringify/-/fast-json-stable-stringify-2.1.0.tgz", @@ -4211,6 +4254,15 @@ "integrity": "sha512-6FlzubTLZG3J2a/NVCAleEhjzq5oxgHyaCU9yYXvcLsvoVaHJq/s5xXI6/XXP6tz7R9xAOtHnSO/tXtF3WRTlA==", "license": "MIT" }, + "node_modules/ip-address": { + "version": "10.7.5", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ip-address/-/ip-address-10.7.5.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-t2v0rkILYv9WXmSL7TpAaU3HXgaFYOPUcH3QHgwQ++gpJuH3bqyMy4Fvt/DJCTKwzH3Cf+bAp5W/mFL39KPLzA==", + "license": "MIT", + "engines": { + "node": ">= 12" + } + }, "node_modules/ipaddr.js": { "version": "1.9.1", "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ipaddr.js/-/ipaddr.js-1.9.1.tgz", From 1516385eae29ac79139e9ca235cef13f989ea371 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:02:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 14/83] docs: document federation peer and CORS configuration Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/.env.example | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/backend/.env.example b/backend/.env.example index 11edf7df..0b2a2c93 100644 --- a/backend/.env.example +++ b/backend/.env.example @@ -22,3 +22,11 @@ STRIPE_KEY= UI_STRING=Fruitful_app NODE_ID=backend-node-01 NODE_TYPE=backend + +# Comma-separated exact browser origins allowed to call this API. +CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://www.ntari.org + +# Federation peer authentication (use random secrets of at least 32 characters). +# FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID=backend-node-01 +# FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET= +# FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON={"peer-node-01":"replace-with-a-distinct-32-byte-secret"} From a9d843a46d2e76887649a4415561889af1adce59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:04:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 15/83] security: authenticate federation sync and support shared Redis request limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js | 45 ++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js index 33e056ae..1180f80a 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js @@ -2,39 +2,47 @@ const axios = require('axios'); const dynamodbClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); const { NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME } = require('./models/nodeRegistry'); const { createPeerHeaders } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); - -const BACKEND_URL = process.env.BACKEND_URL || 'http://localhost:5000'; +const { importFederatedData } = require('../sync/importHelper'); const runFederationSync = async () => { - const nodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID; - const secret = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET; - if (!nodeId || !secret || secret.length < 32) { + const localNodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID || process.env.NODE_ID; + const localSecret = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET; + if (!localNodeId || !localSecret || localSecret.length < 32) { console.error('Federation sync skipped: local peer credentials are not configured'); return; } + let peerSecrets; + try { + peerSecrets = JSON.parse(process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON || '{}'); + } catch { + console.error('Federation sync skipped: FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON is invalid'); + return; + } + const { Items: nodes = [] } = await dynamodbClient .scan({ TableName: NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME }) .promise(); for (const node of nodes) { try { + // A peer must be present in the operator's authenticated peer registry. + if (!node.nodeId || typeof peerSecrets[node.nodeId] !== 'string' || peerSecrets[node.nodeId].length < 32) { + console.error('Federation sync skipped for an unconfigured peer'); + continue; + } + const exportPath = '/federation/export'; - const exportHeaders = createPeerHeaders({ nodeId, secret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath }); + const headers = createPeerHeaders({ + nodeId: localNodeId, secret: localSecret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath + }); const { data } = await axios.get(new URL(exportPath, node.url).toString(), { - headers: exportHeaders, - timeout: 15000 + headers, timeout: 15000 }); - const importPath = '/federation/import'; - const body = JSON.stringify(data); - const importHeaders = createPeerHeaders({ - nodeId, secret, method: 'POST', path: importPath, body - }); - await axios.post(new URL(importPath, BACKEND_URL).toString(), body, { - headers: { ...importHeaders, 'content-type': 'application/json' }, - timeout: 30000 - }); + // Source identity comes from the locally managed NodeRegistry record whose + // peer credential is configured above, never from fields in the response body. + await importFederatedData(data, { sourceNodeId: node.nodeId }); await dynamodbClient.update({ TableName: NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME, @@ -42,14 +50,13 @@ const runFederationSync = async () => { UpdateExpression: 'set lastSyncAt = :time', ExpressionAttributeValues: { ':time': new Date().toISOString() } }).promise(); - console.log('Federation sync completed with configured peer'); + console.log('Federation sync completed with a registered peer'); } catch (error) { console.error('Federation sync failed for a registered peer:', error.message); } } }; -// Run every six hours. server.js may invoke the first run at startup. const timer = setInterval(runFederationSync, 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000); if (typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref(); From eb9d6efb750a44e6f6ec3e51b44769807ff34220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:04:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 16/83] security: support shared Redis-backed request limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/rateLimit.js | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js index 4588d6cc..d9a6cb96 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js +++ b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js @@ -1,11 +1,46 @@ const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -function createRequestLimiter({ windowMs = 60 * 1000, limit = 60, message = 'Too many requests' } = {}) { +let redis = null; +if (process.env.REDIS_URL) { + const Redis = require('ioredis'); + redis = new Redis(process.env.REDIS_URL, { + maxRetriesPerRequest: 1, + enableOfflineQueue: false + }); +} else if (process.env.RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_REQUIRED === 'true') { + throw new Error('REDIS_URL is required when RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_REQUIRED=true'); +} + +class RedisRateLimitStore { + constructor(client, prefix) { + this.client = client; + this.prefix = prefix; + this.windowMs = 60000; + } + init(options) { this.windowMs = options.windowMs; } + async increment(key) { + const redisKey = this.prefix + ':' + key; + const totalHits = await this.client.incr(redisKey); + if (totalHits === 1) await this.client.pexpire(redisKey, this.windowMs); + let ttl = await this.client.pttl(redisKey); + if (ttl < 0) { + await this.client.pexpire(redisKey, this.windowMs); + ttl = this.windowMs; + } + return { totalHits, resetTime: new Date(Date.now() + ttl) }; + } + async decrement(key) { await this.client.decr(this.prefix + ':' + key); } + async resetKey(key) { await this.client.del(this.prefix + ':' + key); } + async shutdown() {} +} + +function createRequestLimiter({ prefix, windowMs = 60000, limit = 60, message = 'Too many requests' }) { return rateLimit({ windowMs, limit, standardHeaders: 'draft-8', legacyHeaders: false, + ...(redis ? { store: new RedisRateLimitStore(redis, prefix) } : {}), keyGenerator: req => { const userId = req.user?.userId; return typeof userId === 'string' && userId @@ -17,10 +52,10 @@ function createRequestLimiter({ windowMs = 60 * 1000, limit = 60, message = 'Too } module.exports = { - apiRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 120 }), - userWriteRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 20, message: 'Too many user-management requests' }), - locationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 30, message: 'Too many location requests' }), - chatRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 60, message: 'Too many chat requests' }), - streamRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 20, message: 'Too many stream requests' }), - federationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ limit: 30, message: 'Too many federation requests' }) + apiRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:api', limit: 120 }), + userWriteRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:user-write', limit: 20, message: 'Too many user-management requests' }), + locationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:location', limit: 30, message: 'Too many location requests' }), + chatRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:chat', limit: 60, message: 'Too many chat requests' }), + streamRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:stream', limit: 20, message: 'Too many stream requests' }), + federationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:federation', limit: 30, message: 'Too many federation requests' }) }; From 2b15f99122a7e55eb9bfec2b11e87dbd67153d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:04:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 17/83] build: declare Redis client for distributed rate limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/package.json | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/package.json b/backend/package.json index ba7c7356..abacf17a 100644 --- a/backend/package.json +++ b/backend/package.json @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.2", "openai": "^4.76.0", "stripe": "^18.5.0", - "twilio": "^4.21.0" + "twilio": "^4.21.0", + "ioredis": "^5.11.1" }, "devDependencies": { "jest": "^30.5.2", From 32e8a65142babac604cbdf651ac60e6c67a36266 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:04:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 18/83] build: synchronize Redis client lockfile dependency Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/package-lock.json | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/package-lock.json b/backend/package-lock.json index 71cdb57a..8586abd8 100644 --- a/backend/package-lock.json +++ b/backend/package-lock.json @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.2", "openai": "^4.76.0", "stripe": "^18.5.0", - "twilio": "^4.21.0" + "twilio": "^4.21.0", + "ioredis": "^5.11.1" }, "devDependencies": { "jest": "^30.5.2", From 21d8036d728b49f503abc6f54c0f059291050064 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:04:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 19/83] docs: add Redis rate-limit deployment configuration Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/.env.example | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/backend/.env.example b/backend/.env.example index 0b2a2c93..5faba62b 100644 --- a/backend/.env.example +++ b/backend/.env.example @@ -30,3 +30,8 @@ CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://www.ntari.org # FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID=backend-node-01 # FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET= # FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON={"peer-node-01":"replace-with-a-distinct-32-byte-secret"} + +# Shared store for distributed rate limits (required for multiple server instances). +# REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379 +# Set true in multi-instance deployments to fail startup if Redis is missing. +RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_REQUIRED=false From bda40d0442db9e4a0df7d8cb531b404875c4f8b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:33 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/83] test: expose limiter factory for isolated regression coverage Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/rateLimit.js | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js index d9a6cb96..a0a57825 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js +++ b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ function createRequestLimiter({ prefix, windowMs = 60000, limit = 60, message = } module.exports = { + createRequestLimiter, apiRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:api', limit: 120 }), userWriteRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:user-write', limit: 20, message: 'Too many user-management requests' }), locationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:location', limit: 30, message: 'Too many location requests' }), From 5a2db08aa3647d521bb2aeadfe3480eab77a38f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:36 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 21/83] fix: preserve existing signup password compatibility Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/authRoutes.js | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/authRoutes.js b/backend/routes/authRoutes.js index ec2bde7c..78bfe4af 100644 --- a/backend/routes/authRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/authRoutes.js @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ router.post('/register', async (req, res) => { const { username, email, phone, password } = req.body || {}; if (typeof username !== 'string' || !username.trim() || typeof email !== 'string' || !email.trim() || - typeof password !== 'string' || password.length < 12) { - return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Username, email, and a password of at least 12 characters are required' }); + typeof password !== 'string' || password.length < 8) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Username, email, and a password of at least 8 characters are required' }); } const user = createUserItem({ id: randomUUID(), username: username.trim(), email: email.trim().toLowerCase(), From babfc72774f43d4ba2f7b502b0f265ace1906a88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 22/83] fix: keep administrative provisioning compatible with existing password policy Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/userRoutes.js | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/userRoutes.js b/backend/routes/userRoutes.js index 688a68e5..a532ab2e 100644 --- a/backend/routes/userRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/userRoutes.js @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ router.post('/', userWriteRateLimit, requireAdmin, async (req, res) => { const { username, email, phone, password, locationType, locationPrivacy, role } = body; if (typeof username !== 'string' || !username.trim() || typeof email !== 'string' || !email.trim() || - typeof password !== 'string' || password.length < 12) { - return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Username, email, and a password of at least 12 characters are required' }); + typeof password !== 'string' || password.length < 8) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Username, email, and a password of at least 8 characters are required' }); } if (locationPrivacy !== undefined && typeof locationPrivacy !== 'boolean') { return res.status(400).json({ error: 'locationPrivacy must be a boolean' }); From 1fdb801e84346875a114bbd562e3df3061d31ba9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:42 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 23/83] test: cover user creation authorization and response sanitization Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/__tests__/userRoutes.test.js | 132 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/__tests__/userRoutes.test.js b/backend/routes/__tests__/userRoutes.test.js index 8e0886fc..c1de31aa 100644 --- a/backend/routes/__tests__/userRoutes.test.js +++ b/backend/routes/__tests__/userRoutes.test.js @@ -10,81 +10,101 @@ jest.mock('../../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ const docClient = require('../../lib/dynamodbClient'); const userRoutes = require('../userRoutes'); -describe('userRoutes', () => { +describe('userRoutes security', () => { let app; beforeEach(() => { app = express(); app.use(express.json()); + app.use((req, _res, next) => { + req.user = { userId: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' }; + next(); + }); app.use('/users', userRoutes); docClient.scan.mockReset(); docClient.put.mockReset(); }); - describe('GET /users', () => { - it('returns users without passwords', async () => { - docClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ - promise: () => Promise.resolve({ - Items: [ - { id: '1', username: 'john', password: 'hash', role: 'consumer', location: 'NY' } - ] - }) - }); - - const res = await request(app).get('/users'); - expect(res.status).toBe(200); - expect(res.body).toEqual([ - { id: '1', username: 'john', role: 'consumer', location: 'NY' } - ]); - expect(res.body[0].password).toBeUndefined(); + test('public directory returns only an explicit public DTO', async () => { + docClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ + promise: async () => ({ + Items: [{ + id: 'u1', username: 'alice', role: 'admin', email: 'alice@example.test', + phone: '555-0100', password: 'hash', verificationCode: 'secret', + verified: true, location: 'private address', coordinates: { lat: 1, long: 2 }, + locationType: 'farm', reputationScore: 5, reputationWeight: 2 + }] + }) }); - it('applies role and location filters', async () => { - docClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ promise: () => Promise.resolve({ Items: [] }) }); + const response = await request(app).get('/users'); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(response.body).toEqual([{ + id: 'u1', username: 'alice', locationType: 'farm', + reputationScore: 5, reputationWeight: 2 + }]); + expect(docClient.scan).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ + ProjectionExpression: expect.stringContaining('username') + })); + }); - await request(app).get('/users?role=farmer&location=Texas'); + test('rejects caller-supplied IDs before writing', async () => { + const response = await request(app).post('/users').send({ + id: 'victim-id', username: 'attacker', email: 'a@example.test', password: 'long-password' + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(400); + expect(docClient.put).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); - expect(docClient.scan).toHaveBeenCalledWith( - expect.objectContaining({ - FilterExpression: 'role = :role AND location = :location', - ExpressionAttributeValues: { ':role': 'farmer', ':location': 'Texas' } - }) - ); + test('rejects shared API-key-style callers without a verified admin identity', async () => { + app = express(); + app.use(express.json()); + app.use('/users', userRoutes); + const response = await request(app).post('/users').send({ + username: 'attacker', email: 'a@example.test', password: 'long-password' }); + expect(response.status).toBe(403); + expect(docClient.put).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); }); - describe('POST /users', () => { - it('creates user with hashed password and defaults', async () => { - docClient.put.mockReturnValue({ promise: () => Promise.resolve({}) }); + test('rejects authenticated non-admin callers', async () => { + app = express(); + app.use(express.json()); + app.use((req, _res, next) => { + req.user = { userId: 'member-1', role: 'consumer' }; + next(); + }); + app.use('/users', userRoutes); + const response = await request(app).post('/users').send({ + username: 'member', email: 'm@example.test', password: 'long-password' + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(403); + expect(docClient.put).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); - const res = await request(app) - .post('/users') - .send({ - id: '1', - username: 'alice', - email: 'a@b.com', - password: 'secret', - role: 'producer', - location: 'CA' - }); + test('creates a server-ID account with a hash and atomic no-overwrite condition', async () => { + docClient.put.mockReturnValue({ promise: async () => ({}) }); + const response = await request(app).post('/users').send({ + username: 'alice', email: 'a@b.com', password: 'secretsecret', + role: 'producer', locationType: 'farm' + }); - expect(res.status).toBe(201); - expect(res.body.user).toMatchObject({ - id: '1', - username: 'alice', - email: 'a@b.com', - role: 'producer', - location: 'CA', - verified: false, - reputationScore: 0 - }); - expect(res.body.user.password).toBeUndefined(); + expect(response.status).toBe(201); + expect(response.body.user).toMatchObject({ username: 'alice', locationType: 'farm' }); + expect(response.body.user.id).toBeTruthy(); + expect(response.body.user.role).toBeUndefined(); + const params = docClient.put.mock.calls[0][0]; + expect(params.ConditionExpression).toBe('attribute_not_exists(#id)'); + expect(params.Item.id).not.toBe('undefined'); + expect(await bcrypt.compare('secretsecret', params.Item.password)).toBe(true); + }); - const params = docClient.put.mock.calls[0][0]; - const stored = params.Item; - expect(stored.verified).toBe(false); - expect(stored.reputationScore).toBe(0); - expect(await bcrypt.compare('secret', stored.password)).toBe(true); + test('reports conditional ID collision without overwriting', async () => { + docClient.put.mockReturnValue({ + promise: async () => { throw Object.assign(new Error('collision'), { code: 'ConditionalCheckFailedException' }); } }); + const response = await request(app).post('/users').send({ + username: 'alice', email: 'a@b.com', password: 'secretsecret' + }); + expect(response.status).toBe(409); }); }); - From 37ef10c979df72cc9020923386d8b82016e4f13c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:45 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 24/83] test: cover federation user sanitization provenance and collisions Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/sync/__tests__/importHelper.test.js | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/sync/__tests__/importHelper.test.js b/backend/sync/__tests__/importHelper.test.js index 82da6c83..2c1826b0 100644 --- a/backend/sync/__tests__/importHelper.test.js +++ b/backend/sync/__tests__/importHelper.test.js @@ -1,14 +1,57 @@ const { test } = require('node:test'); const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); const docClient = require('../../lib/dynamodbClient'); -const { importFederatedData } = require('../importHelper'); +const { importFederatedData, sanitizeImportedUser } = require('../importHelper'); test('empty federation import succeeds without writes', async () => { docClient.put = () => { throw new Error('unexpected write'); }; assert.deepEqual(await importFederatedData({}), { success: true }); }); +test('import requires source identity established by peer authentication', async () => { + assert.throws(() => sanitizeImportedUser({ id: 'remote-1', username: 'alice' }), /source identity/); +}); + +test('import strips account authority and preserves authenticated provenance', async () => { + const item = sanitizeImportedUser({ + id: 'remote-1', username: 'alice', password: 'hash', verificationCode: 'secret', + verified: true, role: 'admin', email: 'a@example.test', phone: '555-0100', + coordinates: { lat: 1, long: 2 }, sourceNodeId: 'forged-node', + originNodeId: 'origin-node', originUserId: 'origin-user', + arbitrarySecret: 'must-not-survive', reputationScore: 8 + }, 'authenticated-peer'); + + assert.deepEqual(item, { + id: 'remote-1', username: 'alice', reputationScore: 8, + sourceNodeId: 'authenticated-peer', remoteUserId: 'remote-1', + originNodeId: 'origin-node', originUserId: 'origin-user' + }); +}); + +test('conditional user create refuses collisions without a pre-read race', async () => { + const writes = []; + docClient.put = params => ({ + promise: async () => { + writes.push(params); + throw Object.assign(new Error('collision'), { code: 'ConditionalCheckFailedException' }); + } + }); + + await assert.rejects( + () => importFederatedData({ + users: [{ id: 'existing-id', username: 'alice', role: 'admin', password: 'stolen' }] + }, { sourceNodeId: 'peer-1' }), + error => error.code === 'ConditionalCheckFailedException' + ); + assert.equal(writes.length, 1); + assert.equal(writes[0].ConditionExpression, 'attribute_not_exists(#id)'); + assert.equal(writes[0].Item.sourceNodeId, 'peer-1'); + assert.equal(writes[0].Item.password, undefined); +}); + test('federation import propagates storage errors', async () => { docClient.put = () => ({ promise: async () => { throw new Error('write failed'); } }); - await assert.rejects(importFederatedData({ users: [{ id: 'u1' }] }), /write failed/); + await assert.rejects(importFederatedData({ users: [{ id: 'u3', username: 'bob' }] }, { + sourceNodeId: 'peer-1' + }), /write failed/); }); From e4464411ff604893d5f2810955df9eb78c9d9545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 25/83] test: cover federation authentication and rate limiting Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- .../__tests__/federationPeerAuth.test.js | 49 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/__tests__/federationPeerAuth.test.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/__tests__/federationPeerAuth.test.js b/backend/middleware/__tests__/federationPeerAuth.test.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6ac38907 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/__tests__/federationPeerAuth.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +const express = require('express'); +const request = require('supertest'); +const { requireFederationPeer, createPeerHeaders } = require('../federationPeerAuth'); + +describe('federation peer authentication', () => { + const saved = process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON; + let app; + beforeEach(() => { + process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON = JSON.stringify({ 'peer-1': '0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef' }); + app = express(); + app.use(express.json({ verify(req, _res, buffer) { req.rawBody = Buffer.from(buffer); } })); + app.post('/federation/import', requireFederationPeer, (req, res) => { + res.json({ authenticatedPeer: req.federationPeer.nodeId }); + }); + }); + afterAll(() => { + if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON; + else process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON = saved; + }); + + test('accepts a valid signature and sets peer identity from the credential', async () => { + const body = JSON.stringify({ sourceNodeId: 'forged-body-identity', users: [] }); + const headers = createPeerHeaders({ + nodeId: 'peer-1', secret: '0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef', + method: 'POST', path: '/federation/import', body + }); + const response = await request(app).post('/federation/import') + .set(headers).set('Content-Type', 'application/json').send(body); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(response.body.authenticatedPeer).toBe('peer-1'); + }); + + test('fails closed when peer credentials are missing', async () => { + const response = await request(app).post('/federation/import').send({ users: [] }); + expect(response.status).toBe(401); + }); + + test('rejects an invalid signature', async () => { + const body = JSON.stringify({ users: [] }); + const headers = createPeerHeaders({ + nodeId: 'peer-1', secret: '0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef', + method: 'POST', path: '/federation/import', body + }); + headers['x-federation-signature'] = '0'.repeat(64); + const response = await request(app).post('/federation/import') + .set(headers).set('Content-Type', 'application/json').send(body); + expect(response.status).toBe(401); + }); +}); From 991c232e4d196d22314e084f314b437d880b54fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:05:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 26/83] test: cover federation authentication and rate limiting Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- .../middleware/__tests__/rateLimit.test.js | 20 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/__tests__/rateLimit.test.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/__tests__/rateLimit.test.js b/backend/middleware/__tests__/rateLimit.test.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..55155b29 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/__tests__/rateLimit.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +const express = require('express'); +const request = require('supertest'); +const { createRequestLimiter } = require('../rateLimit'); + +describe('request rate limiting', () => { + test('limits by authenticated account identity', async () => { + const app = express(); + app.use((req, _res, next) => { req.user = { userId: 'account-a' }; next(); }); + app.get('/limited', createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'test-account', limit: 1 }), (_req, res) => res.sendStatus(204)); + expect((await request(app).get('/limited')).status).toBe(204); + expect((await request(app).get('/limited')).status).toBe(429); + }); + + test('uses IP identity for shared-key callers without req.user', async () => { + const app = express(); + app.get('/limited', createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'test-ip', limit: 1 }), (_req, res) => res.sendStatus(204)); + expect((await request(app).get('/limited')).status).toBe(204); + expect((await request(app).get('/limited')).status).toBe(429); + }); +}); From c1f33f4581b54590980165aa9fbb71173094a722 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:06:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 27/83] security: sign and verify federation export responses Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js b/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js index 34ba2bb5..dc56f5da 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js +++ b/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js @@ -84,4 +84,34 @@ function requireFederationPeer(req, res, next) { } } -module.exports = { requireFederationPeer, createPeerHeaders }; +function createPeerResponseHeaders({ nodeId, secret, method, path, body }) { + const timestamp = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)); + const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex'); + const payload = [timestamp, 'RESPONSE:' + method.toUpperCase(), path.split('?')[0], digest].join('.'); + const signature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex'); + return { + 'x-federation-response-node-id': nodeId, + 'x-federation-response-timestamp': timestamp, + 'x-federation-response-signature': signature + }; +} + +function verifyPeerResponse({ headers, expectedNodeId, secret, method, path, body }) { + const nodeId = headers['x-federation-response-node-id']; + const timestamp = headers['x-federation-response-timestamp']; + const signature = headers['x-federation-response-signature']; + const seconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000); + if (nodeId !== expectedNodeId || !timestamp || !/^\\d{10}$/.test(timestamp) || + Math.abs(seconds - Number(timestamp)) > MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS) return false; + const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex'); + const payload = [timestamp, 'RESPONSE:' + method.toUpperCase(), path.split('?')[0], digest].join('.'); + const expected = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex'); + return safeEqualHex(signature, expected); +} + +module.exports = { + requireFederationPeer, + createPeerHeaders, + createPeerResponseHeaders, + verifyPeerResponse +}; From ef8dd74529c554f57b0840fbf66f87f2b061a5e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:06:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 28/83] security: sign allowlisted federation exports Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationRoutes.js | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js index 80c97198..be37828b 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ const { LISTING_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/listing'); const { TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/transaction'); const { USER_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/user'); const { importFederatedData } = require('../sync/importHelper'); -const { requireFederationPeer } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); +const { requireFederationPeer, createPeerResponseHeaders } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); const { federationRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); const pick = (item, fields) => Object.fromEntries( @@ -42,7 +42,17 @@ router.get('/export', async (_req, res) => { 'id', 'contractId', 'consumerId', 'producerId', 'rating', 'status' ])); - return res.json({ listings, transactions, users }); + const payload = JSON.stringify({ listings, transactions, users }); + const peers = JSON.parse(process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON || '{}'); + const secret = peers[_req.federationPeer.nodeId]; + const nodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID || process.env.NODE_ID; + if (!nodeId || typeof secret !== 'string' || secret.length < 32) { + return res.status(503).json({ error: 'Federation response signing is not configured' }); + } + res.set(createPeerResponseHeaders({ + nodeId, secret, method: 'GET', path: '/federation/export', body: payload + })); + return res.type('application/json').send(payload); } catch { return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Export failed' }); } From 1f2b3f8503300501c6d5da08b8fae911c09bd1be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:06:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 29/83] security: verify authenticated federation peer responses Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js index 1180f80a..cf7bce51 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ const axios = require('axios'); const dynamodbClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); const { NODE_REGISTRY_TABLE_NAME } = require('./models/nodeRegistry'); -const { createPeerHeaders } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); +const { createPeerHeaders, verifyPeerResponse } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); const { importFederatedData } = require('../sync/importHelper'); const runFederationSync = async () => { @@ -36,9 +36,25 @@ const runFederationSync = async () => { const headers = createPeerHeaders({ nodeId: localNodeId, secret: localSecret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath }); - const { data } = await axios.get(new URL(exportPath, node.url).toString(), { + const peerUrl = new URL(node.url); + if (peerUrl.protocol !== 'https:' && !['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]'].includes(peerUrl.hostname)) { + throw new Error('Federation peers must use HTTPS'); + } + const response = await axios.get(new URL(exportPath, peerUrl).toString(), { headers, timeout: 15000 }); + const responseBody = JSON.stringify(response.data); + if (!verifyPeerResponse({ + headers: response.headers, + expectedNodeId: node.nodeId, + secret: localSecret, + method: 'GET', + path: exportPath, + body: responseBody + })) { + throw new Error('Federation peer response signature is invalid'); + } + const data = response.data; // Source identity comes from the locally managed NodeRegistry record whose // peer credential is configured above, never from fields in the response body. From 6f11ad43013287ea641427c019aa01f69dccfe6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:06:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 30/83] fix: load environment before initializing distributed limiter Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index b8bf5e75..72b58fa0 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ try { cors = require('cors'); } catch { cors = () => (_req, _res, next) => next( let dotenv; try { dotenv = require('dotenv'); } catch { dotenv = { config: () => {} }; } const path = require('path'); +dotenv.config(); const authMiddleware = require('./middleware/authMiddleware'); const { apiRateLimit, chatRateLimit, streamRateLimit, locationRateLimit } = require('./middleware/rateLimit'); -dotenv.config(); const minimal = process.env.MINIMAL_SERVER === 'true'; const app = express(); const allowedOrigins = (process.env.CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS || 'https://www.ntari.org').split(',').map(origin => origin.trim()).filter(Boolean); From 246b10f076fbdfb92373d4ecb37fdd32de24e4f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:08:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 31/83] security: disable unowned upload downloads until attachment authorization lands Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index 72b58fa0..ef8562d7 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -28,9 +28,7 @@ global.emitToken = (conversationId, id, token) => sendConversationEvent(conversa global.emitMessage = (conversationId, message) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'message', { message }); app.use(authMiddleware); app.use(apiRateLimit); -app.use('/uploads', apiRateLimit, express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'uploads'))); -app.use('/conversations', chatRateLimit); -app.use('/messages', chatRateLimit); +// Private uploads are disabled until conversation-owner authorization is deployed (#191).\napp.use('/uploads', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Attachment downloads are temporarily unavailable pending owner authorization' })); app.use('/api/location', locationRateLimit); let runFederationSync; if (!minimal) { From 7565903c9051ff2f762b72d0acef0e483d4a02e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:08:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 32/83] security: rate limit conversations after authentication Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index 49739001..0f96992c 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ const router = express.Router(); const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); const ctrl = require('../controllers/conversation_controller'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); +const { chatRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); -router.use(auth); +router.use(auth, chatRateLimit); router.post('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); router.get('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); router.put('/:id', asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); From cf55ff101c0b7d2ee1209bd359bee9be310b8e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:08:30 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 33/83] security: rate limit messages after authentication Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 3a0367c2..3aeab913 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ const router = express.Router(); const commController = require('../controllers/communication_controller'); const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); +const { chatRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); -router.use(auth); +router.use(auth, chatRateLimit); router.post('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); router.get('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); From a779553d9eb9843a2b1b8a4ee5a413223ac369b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:09:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 34/83] test: verify admin route authorization and response allowlists Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/__tests__/adminRoutes.test.js | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/routes/__tests__/adminRoutes.test.js diff --git a/backend/routes/__tests__/adminRoutes.test.js b/backend/routes/__tests__/adminRoutes.test.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a9328c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/routes/__tests__/adminRoutes.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +const request = require('supertest'); +const express = require('express'); + +jest.mock('../../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ + scan: jest.fn() +})); + +const docClient = require('../../lib/dynamodbClient'); +const adminRoutes = require('../admin'); + +describe('admin routes access and response contracts', () => { + let app; + beforeEach(() => { + app = express(); + app.use(express.json()); + app.use((req, _res, next) => { + req.user = { userId: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' }; + next(); + }); + app.use('/api/admin', adminRoutes); + docClient.scan.mockReset(); + }); + + test('denies shared-key callers without a verified admin identity', async () => { + app = express(); + app.use('/api/admin', adminRoutes); + const response = await request(app).get('/api/admin/users'); + expect(response.status).toBe(403); + }); + + test('returns only administrator-approved user fields', async () => { + docClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ + promise: async () => ({ + Items: [{ + id: 'u1', username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.test', phone: '555-0100', + role: 'consumer', verified: true, password: 'bcrypt-hash', + verificationCode: 'secret', coordinates: { lat: 1, long: 2 }, + locationType: 'farm', reputationScore: 3 + }] + }) + }); + const response = await request(app).get('/api/admin/users'); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(response.body).toEqual([{ + id: 'u1', username: 'alice', email: 'alice@example.test', phone: '555-0100', + role: 'consumer', verified: true, locationType: 'farm', reputationScore: 3 + }]); + expect(docClient.scan).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ + ProjectionExpression: expect.stringContaining('email') + })); + }); +}); From 3b28d8ac8ef16538e9169b9cc38d6da665459c73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:09:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 35/83] test: verify federation export allowlists and authenticated provenance Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- .../__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js diff --git a/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js b/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9ba9f46a --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +const express = require('express'); +const request = require('supertest'); + +jest.mock('../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ + scan: jest.fn(), + put: jest.fn() +})); + +const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); +const federationRoutes = require('../federation/federationRoutes'); +const { createPeerHeaders, verifyPeerResponse } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); + +describe('federation route security', () => { + const oldEnv = { + peers: process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON, + node: process.env.NODE_ID, + localNode: process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID + }; + const secret = '0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef'; + let app; + + beforeEach(() => { + process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON = JSON.stringify({ 'peer-1': secret }); + process.env.NODE_ID = 'local-node'; + process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID = 'local-node'; + app = express(); + app.use(express.json({ verify(req, _res, buffer) { req.rawBody = Buffer.from(buffer); } })); + app.use('/federation', federationRoutes); + docClient.scan.mockReset(); + docClient.put.mockReset(); + }); + + afterAll(() => { + if (oldEnv.peers === undefined) delete process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON; + else process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON = oldEnv.peers; + if (oldEnv.node === undefined) delete process.env.NODE_ID; + else process.env.NODE_ID = oldEnv.node; + if (oldEnv.localNode === undefined) delete process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID; + else process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID = oldEnv.localNode; + }); + + test('does not export unless the caller proves a configured peer identity', async () => { + const response = await request(app).get('/federation/export'); + expect(response.status).toBe(401); + expect(docClient.scan).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + test('exports only allowlisted user, listing and transaction fields and signs response', async () => { + docClient.scan + .mockReturnValueOnce({ promise: async () => ({ Items: [{ id: 'l1', title: 'Apples', password: 'secret', internal: 'x' }] }) }) + .mockReturnValueOnce({ promise: async () => ({ Items: [{ id: 't1', status: 'pending', cardToken: 'secret' }] }) }) + .mockReturnValueOnce({ promise: async () => ({ Items: [{ + id: 'u1', username: 'alice', email: 'a@example.test', phone: '555-0100', + password: 'hash', verificationCode: 'secret', role: 'admin', verified: true, + coordinates: { lat: 1, long: 2 }, reputationScore: 3 + }] }) }); + + const headers = createPeerHeaders({ + nodeId: 'peer-1', secret, method: 'GET', path: '/federation/export' + }); + const response = await request(app).get('/federation/export').set(headers); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(response.body.users).toEqual([{ + id: 'u1', username: 'alice', reputationScore: 3, + originNodeId: 'local-node', originUserId: 'u1' + }]); + expect(response.body.listings).toEqual([{ id: 'l1', title: 'Apples' }]); + expect(response.body.transactions).toEqual([{ id: 't1', status: 'pending' }]); + expect(verifyPeerResponse({ + headers: response.headers, + expectedNodeId: 'local-node', + secret, + method: 'GET', + path: '/federation/export', + body: JSON.stringify(response.body) + })).toBe(true); + }); + + test('import uses the authenticated peer identity, not a body-supplied source id', async () => { + docClient.put.mockReturnValue({ promise: async () => ({}) }); + const body = JSON.stringify({ + sourceNodeId: 'forged-node', + users: [{ id: 'remote-u1', username: 'bob', role: 'admin', password: 'hash' }] + }); + const headers = createPeerHeaders({ + nodeId: 'peer-1', secret, method: 'POST', path: '/federation/import', body + }); + const response = await request(app).post('/federation/import') + .set(headers).set('Content-Type', 'application/json').send(body); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + const written = docClient.put.mock.calls[0][0]; + expect(written.Item.sourceNodeId).toBe('peer-1'); + expect(written.Item.remoteUserId).toBe('remote-u1'); + expect(written.Item.role).toBeUndefined(); + expect(written.Item.password).toBeUndefined(); + expect(written.ConditionExpression).toBe('attribute_not_exists(#id)'); + }); +}); From 6ff48cca195cce23fbbeebeee4e3c995ef05592e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:09:13 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 36/83] security: allow explicit API key preflight and remove obsolete path import Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index ef8562d7..f7b88d13 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -4,14 +4,13 @@ let cors; try { cors = require('cors'); } catch { cors = () => (_req, _res, next) => next(); } let dotenv; try { dotenv = require('dotenv'); } catch { dotenv = { config: () => {} }; } -const path = require('path'); dotenv.config(); const authMiddleware = require('./middleware/authMiddleware'); const { apiRateLimit, chatRateLimit, streamRateLimit, locationRateLimit } = require('./middleware/rateLimit'); const minimal = process.env.MINIMAL_SERVER === 'true'; const app = express(); const allowedOrigins = (process.env.CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS || 'https://www.ntari.org').split(',').map(origin => origin.trim()).filter(Boolean); -app.use(cors({ origin(origin, callback) { if (!origin || allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) return callback(null, true); return callback(new Error('CORS not allowed for this origin')); }, credentials: true, methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'OPTIONS'], allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization', 'Idempotency-Key', 'X-Federation-Node-Id', 'X-Federation-Timestamp', 'X-Federation-Signature'] })); +app.use(cors({ origin(origin, callback) { if (!origin || allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) return callback(null, true); return callback(new Error('CORS not allowed for this origin')); }, credentials: true, methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'OPTIONS'], allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization', 'Idempotency-Key', 'X-API-Key', 'X-Federation-Node-Id', 'X-Federation-Timestamp', 'X-Federation-Signature'] })); app.use(express.json({ verify(req, _res, buffer) { req.rawBody = Buffer.from(buffer); } })); const tryMount = (route, modPath) => { try { app.use(route, require(modPath)); } catch (err) { console.warn('Skipping ' + modPath + ': ' + err.message); } }; if (!minimal) tryMount('/deposit', './routes/depositRoutes'); From 89e9de3e2f20812762ccce86cabb4e91f0bbb9b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:09:55 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 37/83] security: scope federation limits by authenticated peer identity Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/rateLimit.js | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js index a0a57825..0d49cd7a 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js +++ b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ function createRequestLimiter({ prefix, windowMs = 60000, limit = 60, message = legacyHeaders: false, ...(redis ? { store: new RedisRateLimitStore(redis, prefix) } : {}), keyGenerator: req => { + const peerId = req.federationPeer?.nodeId; + if (typeof peerId === 'string' && peerId) return 'peer:' + peerId; const userId = req.user?.userId; return typeof userId === 'string' && userId ? 'account:' + userId From 8d2a867f8ec237853573aec0c0640622fb5229c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:09:57 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 38/83] security: authenticate federation peers before applying peer request budgets Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationRoutes.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js index be37828b..1d8b75e8 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const pick = (item, fields) => Object.fromEntries( ); // Browser API keys and ordinary member tokens are never federation credentials. -router.use(federationRateLimit, requireFederationPeer); +router.use(requireFederationPeer, federationRateLimit); router.get('/export', async (_req, res) => { try { From 34b4db9f863b5b2a34ea6b8d3480f538187e7a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:10:01 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 39/83] security: route federation through peer auth before general account auth Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index f7b88d13..d12d759c 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ function broadcast(event, data, conversationId) { if (conversationId) sendConver global.broadcast = broadcast; global.emitToken = (conversationId, id, token) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'token', { id, token }); global.emitMessage = (conversationId, message) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'message', { message }); +if (!minimal) tryMount('/federation', './federation/federationRoutes'); + app.use(authMiddleware); app.use(apiRateLimit); // Private uploads are disabled until conversation-owner authorization is deployed (#191).\napp.use('/uploads', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Attachment downloads are temporarily unavailable pending owner authorization' })); From 99f14fc18df3448116a6a96323f8ef522bc674f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:10:04 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 40/83] security: use distinct credentials for each outbound federation peer Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js | 19 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js index cf7bce51..2863cf83 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationSyncJob.js @@ -6,17 +6,15 @@ const { importFederatedData } = require('../sync/importHelper'); const runFederationSync = async () => { const localNodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID || process.env.NODE_ID; - const localSecret = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET; - if (!localNodeId || !localSecret || localSecret.length < 32) { - console.error('Federation sync skipped: local peer credentials are not configured'); + if (!localNodeId) { + console.error('Federation sync skipped: FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID or NODE_ID is not configured'); return; } - - let peerSecrets; + let outboundSecrets; try { - peerSecrets = JSON.parse(process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON || '{}'); + outboundSecrets = JSON.parse(process.env.FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON || '{}'); } catch { - console.error('Federation sync skipped: FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON is invalid'); + console.error('Federation sync skipped: FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON is invalid'); return; } @@ -27,14 +25,15 @@ const runFederationSync = async () => { for (const node of nodes) { try { // A peer must be present in the operator's authenticated peer registry. - if (!node.nodeId || typeof peerSecrets[node.nodeId] !== 'string' || peerSecrets[node.nodeId].length < 32) { + const peerSecret = node.nodeId ? outboundSecrets[node.nodeId] : null; + if (!node.nodeId || typeof peerSecret !== 'string' || peerSecret.length < 32) { console.error('Federation sync skipped for an unconfigured peer'); continue; } const exportPath = '/federation/export'; const headers = createPeerHeaders({ - nodeId: localNodeId, secret: localSecret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath + nodeId: localNodeId, secret: peerSecret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath }); const peerUrl = new URL(node.url); if (peerUrl.protocol !== 'https:' && !['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]'].includes(peerUrl.hostname)) { @@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ const runFederationSync = async () => { if (!verifyPeerResponse({ headers: response.headers, expectedNodeId: node.nodeId, - secret: localSecret, + secret: peerSecret, method: 'GET', path: exportPath, body: responseBody From c7cb34744c58e10208299be292a0c2dbf8047554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:10:11 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 41/83] docs: document per-peer federation secrets Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/.env.example | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/.env.example b/backend/.env.example index 5faba62b..361ccf65 100644 --- a/backend/.env.example +++ b/backend/.env.example @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://www.ntari.org # Federation peer authentication (use random secrets of at least 32 characters). # FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID=backend-node-01 -# FEDERATION_LOCAL_PEER_SECRET= -# FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON={"peer-node-01":"replace-with-a-distinct-32-byte-secret"} +# FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON={"peer-node-01":"replace-with-peer-specific-32-byte-secret"} +# FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON={"remote-node-01":"replace-with-that-peer's-32-byte-secret"} # Shared store for distributed rate limits (required for multiple server instances). # REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379 From ef57f2790879f58d0ed912bf4696633846f91e82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:11:03 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 42/83] fix: correct upload shutdown and federation router order Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index d12d759c..b6f8bf7c 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ let dotenv; try { dotenv = require('dotenv'); } catch { dotenv = { config: () => {} }; } dotenv.config(); const authMiddleware = require('./middleware/authMiddleware'); -const { apiRateLimit, chatRateLimit, streamRateLimit, locationRateLimit } = require('./middleware/rateLimit'); +const { apiRateLimit, streamRateLimit, locationRateLimit } = require('./middleware/rateLimit'); const minimal = process.env.MINIMAL_SERVER === 'true'; const app = express(); const allowedOrigins = (process.env.CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS || 'https://www.ntari.org').split(',').map(origin => origin.trim()).filter(Boolean); @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ app.use(apiRateLimit); app.use('/api/location', locationRateLimit); let runFederationSync; if (!minimal) { - [['/', './routes/api'], ['/api/auth', './routes/authRoutes'], ['/api/keys', './routes/keyRoutes'], ['/api/contracts', './routes/contracts'], ['/api/admin', './routes/admin'], ['/api/marketplace', './marketplace/marketplace_routes'], ['/users', './routes/userRoutes'], ['/products', './routes/products'], ['/broadcast', './routes/broadcastRoutes'], ['/sms', './routes/smsRoutes'], ['/cart', './routes/cartRoutes'], ['/orders', './routes/orderRoutes'], ['/subscriptions', './routes/subscriptionRoutes'], ['/conversations', './routes/conversationRoutes'], ['/messages', './routes/communicationRoutes'], ['/inventory', './routes/inventoryRoutes'], ['/api/location', './routes/locationRoutes'], ['/federation', './federation/federationRoutes'], ['/trends', './trends/trendsRoutes']].forEach(([route, mod]) => tryMount(route, mod)); + [['/', './routes/api'], ['/api/auth', './routes/authRoutes'], ['/api/keys', './routes/keyRoutes'], ['/api/contracts', './routes/contracts'], ['/api/admin', './routes/admin'], ['/api/marketplace', './marketplace/marketplace_routes'], ['/users', './routes/userRoutes'], ['/products', './routes/products'], ['/broadcast', './routes/broadcastRoutes'], ['/sms', './routes/smsRoutes'], ['/cart', './routes/cartRoutes'], ['/orders', './routes/orderRoutes'], ['/subscriptions', './routes/subscriptionRoutes'], ['/conversations', './routes/conversationRoutes'], ['/messages', './routes/communicationRoutes'], ['/inventory', './routes/inventoryRoutes'], ['/api/location', './routes/locationRoutes'], ['/trends', './trends/trendsRoutes']].forEach(([route, mod]) => tryMount(route, mod)); try { runFederationSync = require('./federation/federationSyncJob'); } catch (err) { console.warn('Federation sync disabled: ' + err.message); } } const PORT = process.env.PORT || 5000; From 6dfba1a62e86773d7cf39f4bcf8f59b2fd930793 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:11:06 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 43/83] fix: remove federation response signing variable redeclaration Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationRoutes.js | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js index 1d8b75e8..611733d3 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ router.get('/export', async (_req, res) => { }).promise() ]); - const nodeId = process.env.NODE_ID; + const configuredNodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID || process.env.NODE_ID; const users = (usersRes.Items || []).map(user => ({ ...pick(user, ['id', 'username', 'reputationScore', 'reputationWeight']), - originNodeId: typeof user.originNodeId === 'string' ? user.originNodeId : nodeId, + originNodeId: typeof user.originNodeId === 'string' ? user.originNodeId : configuredNodeId, originUserId: typeof user.originUserId === 'string' ? user.originUserId : user.id })); @@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ router.get('/export', async (_req, res) => { const payload = JSON.stringify({ listings, transactions, users }); const peers = JSON.parse(process.env.FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON || '{}'); const secret = peers[_req.federationPeer.nodeId]; - const nodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID || process.env.NODE_ID; - if (!nodeId || typeof secret !== 'string' || secret.length < 32) { + const responseNodeId = process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID || process.env.NODE_ID; + if (!responseNodeId || typeof secret !== 'string' || secret.length < 32) { return res.status(503).json({ error: 'Federation response signing is not configured' }); } res.set(createPeerResponseHeaders({ - nodeId, secret, method: 'GET', path: '/federation/export', body: payload + nodeId: responseNodeId, secret, method: 'GET', path: '/federation/export', body: payload })); return res.type('application/json').send(payload); } catch { From 47ee4e7a567a9796200f562098ddb44b965d9983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:11:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 44/83] test: correct federation route test module paths Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js b/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js index 9ba9f46a..80ac72d5 100644 --- a/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js +++ b/backend/federation/__tests__/federationRoutes.test.js @@ -1,14 +1,14 @@ const express = require('express'); const request = require('supertest'); -jest.mock('../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ +jest.mock('../../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ scan: jest.fn(), put: jest.fn() })); -const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); -const federationRoutes = require('../federation/federationRoutes'); -const { createPeerHeaders, verifyPeerResponse } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); +const docClient = require('../../lib/dynamodbClient'); +const federationRoutes = require('../federationRoutes'); +const { createPeerHeaders, verifyPeerResponse } = require('../../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); describe('federation route security', () => { const oldEnv = { From c78d7089f8d5f359dd10669c94d30fc583cfa141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:12:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 45/83] fix: finalize fail-closed legacy endpoints and single federation mount Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index b6f8bf7c..afecab03 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -20,16 +20,17 @@ const server = http.createServer(app); app.get('/events', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Global event stream retired; use authenticated conversation streams' })); app.get('/stream/:conversationId', streamRateLimit, (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Conversation streaming is temporarily unavailable pending owner-authenticated stream support' })); const conversationStreams = new Map(); -function sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data) { const clients = conversationStreams.get(conversationId); if (!clients) return; const payload = 'event: ' + event + '\\ndata: ' + JSON.stringify(data) + '\\n\\n'; clients.forEach(res => res.write(payload)); } +function sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data) { const clients = conversationStreams.get(conversationId); if (!clients) return; const payload = 'event: ' + event + '\ndata: ' + JSON.stringify(data) + '\n\n'; clients.forEach(res => res.write(payload)); } function broadcast(event, data, conversationId) { if (conversationId) sendConversationEvent(conversationId, event, data); } global.broadcast = broadcast; global.emitToken = (conversationId, id, token) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'token', { id, token }); global.emitMessage = (conversationId, message) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'message', { message }); +// Federation authenticates with per-peer HMAC credentials, independently of browser API keys. if (!minimal) tryMount('/federation', './federation/federationRoutes'); - app.use(authMiddleware); app.use(apiRateLimit); -// Private uploads are disabled until conversation-owner authorization is deployed (#191).\napp.use('/uploads', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Attachment downloads are temporarily unavailable pending owner authorization' })); +// Private uploads are disabled until conversation-owner authorization is deployed (#191). +app.use('/uploads', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Attachment downloads are temporarily unavailable pending owner authorization' })); app.use('/api/location', locationRateLimit); let runFederationSync; if (!minimal) { From 7ff65fd26678b4134a13d707ac9594a5a678ef0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:12:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 46/83] fix: validate federation response timestamp as ten decimal digits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js b/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js index dc56f5da..4890ba53 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js +++ b/backend/middleware/federationPeerAuth.js @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ function verifyPeerResponse({ headers, expectedNodeId, secret, method, path, bod const timestamp = headers['x-federation-response-timestamp']; const signature = headers['x-federation-response-signature']; const seconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000); - if (nodeId !== expectedNodeId || !timestamp || !/^\\d{10}$/.test(timestamp) || + if (nodeId !== expectedNodeId || !timestamp || !/^[0-9]{10}$/.test(timestamp) || Math.abs(seconds - Number(timestamp)) > MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS) return false; const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(body).digest('hex'); const payload = [timestamp, 'RESPONSE:' + method.toUpperCase(), path.split('?')[0], digest].join('.'); From 5e00460f30b604ecc4eca838801aa440697720d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:13:59 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 47/83] security: share limiter Redis client with concurrent stream reservations Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/rateLimit.js | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js index 0d49cd7a..1a5bc547 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js +++ b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ function createRequestLimiter({ prefix, windowMs = 60000, limit = 60, message = module.exports = { createRequestLimiter, + getRedisClient: () => redis, apiRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:api', limit: 120 }), userWriteRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:user-write', limit: 20, message: 'Too many user-management requests' }), locationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:location', limit: 30, message: 'Too many location requests' }), From ecd1ba9b976f57f591ec0ab294c9a737343ba28a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:14:02 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 48/83] docs: clarify Redis requirement for distributed streams and limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/.env.example | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/backend/.env.example b/backend/.env.example index 361ccf65..a22365bb 100644 --- a/backend/.env.example +++ b/backend/.env.example @@ -34,4 +34,5 @@ CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://www.ntari.org # Shared store for distributed rate limits (required for multiple server instances). # REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379 # Set true in multi-instance deployments to fail startup if Redis is missing. +# The same Redis instance backs request counters and concurrent stream reservations. RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_REQUIRED=false From 7db451d9af1235a61508d1df6a11332fa2520eca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:14:05 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 49/83] security: provide shared-store chat rate limiter for chat auth routes Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/chatRateLimit.js | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/chatRateLimit.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/chatRateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/chatRateLimit.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..300c227e --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/chatRateLimit.js @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +const { createRequestLimiter } = require('./rateLimit'); + +// Mount after chatAuth so req.user.userId is a verified account identity. +module.exports = function chatRateLimit(limit = 60) { + return createRequestLimiter({ + prefix: 'agrinet:chat', + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit, + message: 'Too many chat requests, please try again later' + }); +}; From 7d90754317126b4786eb371029b5eb79609d05c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:14:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 50/83] security: add shared active-stream cap with Redis reservations Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js b/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfdbd1a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +const { randomUUID } = require('node:crypto'); +const { getRedisClient } = require('./rateLimit'); + +const localReservations = new Map(); +const RESERVATION_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; + +const ACQUIRE_SCRIPT = [ + "redis.call('ZREMRANGEBYSCORE', KEYS[1], '-inf', ARGV[1])", + "local count = redis.call('ZCARD', KEYS[1])", + "if count >= tonumber(ARGV[2]) then return 0 end", + "redis.call('ZADD', KEYS[1], ARGV[3], ARGV[4])", + "redis.call('PEXPIRE', KEYS[1], ARGV[5])", + "return 1" +].join('\n'); + +const RELEASE_SCRIPT = [ + "redis.call('ZREM', KEYS[1], ARGV[1])", + "if redis.call('ZCARD', KEYS[1]) == 0 then redis.call('DEL', KEYS[1]) end", + "return 1" +].join('\n'); + +async function acquire(userId, reservationId, expiresAt, maximum) { + const redis = getRedisClient(); + if (redis) { + const key = 'agrinet:active-streams:' + userId; + const result = await redis.eval( + ACQUIRE_SCRIPT, 1, key, Date.now(), maximum, expiresAt, + reservationId, RESERVATION_TTL_MS + ); + return Number(result) === 1; + } + + // Process-local fallback is appropriate only for a single-instance deployment. + const now = Date.now(); + const reservations = localReservations.get(userId) || new Map(); + for (const [id, expiry] of reservations) { + if (expiry <= now) reservations.delete(id); + } + if (reservations.size >= maximum) { + localReservations.set(userId, reservations); + return false; + } + reservations.set(reservationId, expiresAt); + localReservations.set(userId, reservations); + return true; +} + +async function release(userId, reservationId) { + const redis = getRedisClient(); + if (redis) { + await redis.eval( + RELEASE_SCRIPT, 1, 'agrinet:active-streams:' + userId, reservationId + ); + return; + } + const reservations = localReservations.get(userId); + if (!reservations) return; + reservations.delete(reservationId); + if (reservations.size === 0) localReservations.delete(userId); +} + +function createConcurrentStreamLimit({ maximum = 5 } = {}) { + return async function concurrentStreamLimit(req, res, next) { + const userId = req.user?.userId; + const expiresAt = Number(req.user?.exp) * 1000; + if (typeof userId !== 'string' || !userId || !Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt <= Date.now()) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Valid account token required for streaming' }); + } + + const reservationId = randomUUID(); + let admitted; + try { + admitted = await acquire(userId, reservationId, expiresAt, maximum); + } catch { + return res.status(503).json({ error: 'Stream capacity service unavailable' }); + } + if (!admitted) { + return res.status(429).json({ error: 'Too many open streams for this account' }); + } + + let released = false; + const cleanup = () => { + if (released) return; + released = true; + release(userId, reservationId).catch(() => { + // Expiring Redis reservations provide crash recovery if release cannot complete. + }); + }; + res.once('close', cleanup); + res.once('finish', cleanup); + res.once('error', cleanup); + return next(); + }; +} + +module.exports = { createConcurrentStreamLimit }; From a8fe74cff94e07061e5482fbb2badeae0917b257 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:14:13 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 51/83] test: cover open stream limits and disconnect slot release Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- .../__tests__/streamConcurrency.test.js | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/__tests__/streamConcurrency.test.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/__tests__/streamConcurrency.test.js b/backend/middleware/__tests__/streamConcurrency.test.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59fbf203 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/__tests__/streamConcurrency.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +const { EventEmitter } = require('node:events'); +const { createConcurrentStreamLimit } = require('../streamConcurrency'); + +function response() { + const res = new EventEmitter(); + res.statusCode = 200; + res.status = code => { res.statusCode = code; return res; }; + res.json = body => { res.body = body; return res; }; + return res; +} + +describe('concurrent stream limits', () => { + test('caps open streams per account and releases a slot on disconnect', async () => { + const middleware = createConcurrentStreamLimit({ maximum: 1 }); + const req = { user: { userId: 'stream-user', exp: Math.ceil(Date.now() / 1000) + 60 } }; + const first = response(); + let firstNext = false; + await middleware(req, first, () => { firstNext = true; }); + expect(firstNext).toBe(true); + + const second = response(); + let secondNext = false; + await middleware(req, second, () => { secondNext = true; }); + expect(secondNext).toBe(false); + expect(second.statusCode).toBe(429); + + first.emit('close'); + await new Promise(resolve => setImmediate(resolve)); + + const third = response(); + let thirdNext = false; + await middleware(req, third, () => { thirdNext = true; }); + expect(thirdNext).toBe(true); + third.emit('close'); + }); + + test('fails closed without a valid account and unexpired token', async () => { + const middleware = createConcurrentStreamLimit(); + const res = response(); + await middleware({ user: { userId: 'missing-exp' } }, res, () => { throw new Error('next must not run'); }); + expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401); + }); +}); From 98654a64188c1ff5b1c4cc44157d41c53d5316e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:15:22 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 52/83] security: place shared chat limiter after authentication Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index 0f96992c..fb63712d 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ const router = express.Router(); const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); const ctrl = require('../controllers/conversation_controller'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); -const { chatRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); +const chatRateLimit = require('../middleware/chatRateLimit'); -router.use(auth, chatRateLimit); +router.use(auth, chatRateLimit(120)); router.post('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); router.get('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); router.put('/:id', asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); From ff836d0552b6fd6c70a975d236d0c90ccd81cb47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:15:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 53/83] security: place shared message limiter after authentication Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 3aeab913..2668674f 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ const router = express.Router(); const commController = require('../controllers/communication_controller'); const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); -const { chatRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); +const chatRateLimit = require('../middleware/chatRateLimit'); -router.use(auth, chatRateLimit); +router.use(auth, chatRateLimit(120)); router.post('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); router.get('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); From d08832063970c755d8e8537516b970dcc1f1a89b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:15:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 54/83] fix: retain stale stream reservations long enough to cover JWT lifetime Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js b/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js index dfdbd1a7..24895813 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js +++ b/backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const { randomUUID } = require('node:crypto'); const { getRedisClient } = require('./rateLimit'); const localReservations = new Map(); -const RESERVATION_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; +const RESERVATION_TTL_MS = 8 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; const ACQUIRE_SCRIPT = [ "redis.call('ZREMRANGEBYSCORE', KEYS[1], '-inf', ARGV[1])", From 163a6dfeb072ad9943035aae65f5d952c52b63f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:15:36 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 55/83] docs: specify account federation and distributed limiter rollout Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/docs/security-hardening.md | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/docs/security-hardening.md diff --git a/backend/docs/security-hardening.md b/backend/docs/security-hardening.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18ee4efd --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/docs/security-hardening.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# Agrinet account, federation and request-limit hardening + +This branch closes the account-overwrite and unprotected federation paths and prepares the chat PRs to use the same distributed limit store. + +## Account and user-response boundaries + +- POST /users is administrative provisioning only. It requires a verified JWT principal whose role is admin; the browser/API-key path does not create req.user and cannot pass this check. +- IDs are generated by the server. A supplied id is rejected. DynamoDB writes use attribute_not_exists(id) so a collision cannot replace a prior account. +- Public /users responses are a narrow directory DTO. /api/admin/users requires an administrator and returns an administrative DTO, not a raw DynamoDB row. +- Login responses use the authenticated-account DTO. Password hashes, verification codes and exact coordinates are never included. +- Public signup remains /api/auth/register and uses a conditional create. + +## Federation peer authentication + +Federation endpoints are mounted before the general browser/API-key middleware and require HMAC peer authentication themselves. They do not accept the shared browser API key as peer identity. + +Each peer pair needs a distinct random secret of at least 32 characters: + +- FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID (or existing NODE_ID) is this node's stable identity. +- FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON maps each remote NodeRegistry.nodeId to the secret this node uses when contacting that peer. +- FEDERATION_PEERS_JSON maps authorized inbound sender node IDs to their matching shared secrets. + +For A to synchronize with B, A's outbound entry for B must match B's inbound entry for A. The reverse direction can use a different secret. Never put these values in browser code or commit a real .env file. Keep node clocks synchronized; signed requests and responses have a five-minute clock-skew window. + +Requests sign the timestamp, HTTP method, path and SHA-256 digest of the exact request body. Export responses are also signed and checked against the node ID in the local NodeRegistry record. Production peers must use HTTPS; HTTP is accepted only for loopback development. + +Federation user imports accept an explicit user-field allowlist, reject existing IDs atomically, strip passwords, contact fields, roles and verification state, and record sourceNodeId from the authenticated peer plus remoteUserId. Claimed origin identifiers are retained as provenance metadata from the signed peer payload; they never determine the authenticated sender. + +Exports use explicit field allowlists. The location feature's exact owner coordinates remain in its separate local Locations table and are not part of the user export. + +## Distributed request and connection limits + +express-rate-limit is used for API, user writes, location, chat, stream and federation traffic. Authenticated requests are keyed by req.user.userId; authenticated peers by req.federationPeer.nodeId; application-key traffic without a user identity falls back to source IP. + +When REDIS_URL is configured, request counters and concurrent-stream reservations use Redis and are shared across instances. In a multi-instance deployment, set RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_REQUIRED=true so the service refuses to start without the shared store. Without Redis, counters and stream slots are process-local and suitable only for a documented single-instance deployment. + +backend/middleware/chatRateLimit.js is intended to be mounted after chatAuth. backend/middleware/streamConcurrency.js provides a five-stream-per-account reservation. The authenticated-stream PR should wire the stream route in this order: + +1. chatAuth +2. chatRateLimit(60) +3. createConcurrentStreamLimit({ maximum: 5 }) +4. conversationStreams.open + +The concurrency middleware releases a reservation on response close/finish and Redis reservations expire to recover from process crashes. + +## Temporary fail-closed behavior and merge order + +Until the owner-checked chat changes are deployed: + +- /events and /stream/:conversationId return 410 instead of exposing the legacy unauthenticated feed. +- /uploads returns 410 instead of serving files to any caller holding the shared browser key. + +After #191 is rebased and approved, restore attachment serving only behind chatAuth, the shared chat limiter, and attachmentOwner. After #192 is rebased and approved, replace the temporary stream 410 with the ordered authenticated handler above. Do not restore the old handlers before those protections are present. + +No upload-creation endpoint exists in the current main tree; when one is introduced, place upload throttling on that actual write operation, not only on static download paths. + +## CORS configuration + +Set CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS to the exact deployed chat UI/application origins (comma-separated). Do not use * with credentials. The default remains the existing NTARI web origin. Authorization and the required integration/federation headers are explicitly allowed for preflight. + +## Verification + +The branch adds tests for user/admin response allowlists, non-admin denial, caller-supplied ID rejection, conditional writes, imported-user sanitization and provenance, peer request/response signatures, request limits, and concurrent-stream release. CI should run npm ci, npm test, CodeQL and the location-storage regression workflow on the PR. No local test run is claimed here. From fc9c983aed775ba8127c8f1542d431a982f2f63d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:37:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 56/83] security: declare rate limiter explicitly on conversation routes Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index fb63712d..1a2c67b4 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -3,9 +3,17 @@ const router = express.Router(); const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); const ctrl = require('../controllers/conversation_controller'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); -const chatRateLimit = require('../middleware/chatRateLimit'); +const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -router.use(auth, chatRateLimit(120)); +const chatLimiter = rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId ? 'account:' + req.user.userId : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}); +router.use(auth, chatLimiter); router.post('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); router.get('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); router.put('/:id', asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); From 9a7aea5a0c00acf33fe7a528602d044cd61ac9f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:37:44 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 57/83] security: declare rate limiter explicitly on communication routes Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 2668674f..5c371ffb 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -3,9 +3,17 @@ const router = express.Router(); const commController = require('../controllers/communication_controller'); const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); -const chatRateLimit = require('../middleware/chatRateLimit'); +const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -router.use(auth, chatRateLimit(120)); +const chatLimiter = rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId ? 'account:' + req.user.userId : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}); +router.use(auth, chatLimiter); router.post('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); router.get('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); From dab2fb3816d5a9827925e716b1b6ad40cd1234fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:37:58 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 58/83] ci: run backend tests and whitespace checks for security PRs Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- .github/workflows/security-hardening.yml | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/security-hardening.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-hardening.yml b/.github/workflows/security-hardening.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..035e8752 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/security-hardening.yml @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +name: Security hardening regression + +on: + pull_request: + branches: [main] + paths: + - 'backend/**' + - '.github/workflows/security-hardening.yml' + +permissions: + contents: read + +jobs: + backend-regression: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + defaults: + run: + working-directory: backend + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: '22' + cache: npm + cache-dependency-path: backend/package-lock.json + - name: Install exact lockfile dependencies + run: npm ci + - name: Run complete backend test suite + run: npm test + - name: Check whitespace errors across the PR + working-directory: . + run: git diff --check origin/main...HEAD From 8db3eac5b3f2cd73044c914c2064e2b82b75b36a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:39:11 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 59/83] test: authenticate admin route fixtures and assert secret-free DTOs Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/__tests__/admin.test.js | 43 +++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/__tests__/admin.test.js b/backend/routes/__tests__/admin.test.js index c782c0c9..518f6886 100644 --- a/backend/routes/__tests__/admin.test.js +++ b/backend/routes/__tests__/admin.test.js @@ -9,57 +9,44 @@ const { USER_TABLE_NAME } = require('../../models/user'); const adminRouter = require('../admin'); const app = express(); +app.use((req, _res, next) => { req.user = { userId: 'test-admin', role: 'admin' }; next(); }); app.use('/', adminRouter); -beforeEach(() => { - mockScan.mockReset(); -}); +beforeEach(() => mockScan.mockReset()); describe('GET /users', () => { - it('uses scan and omits password', async () => { + it('uses a minimal projection and omits private account fields', async () => { mockScan.mockReturnValue({ promise: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ - Items: [ - { id: '1', username: 'alice', password: 'secret' } - ] + Items: [{ id: '1', username: 'alice', email: 'a@example.test', role: 'consumer', password: 'secret', verificationCode: 'secret' }] }) }); - const res = await request(app).get('/users'); - - expect(mockScan).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME }); + expect(mockScan).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ + TableName: USER_TABLE_NAME, + ProjectionExpression: expect.stringContaining('email') + })); expect(res.status).toBe(200); - expect(res.body).toEqual([{ id: '1', username: 'alice' }]); + expect(res.body).toEqual([{ id: '1', username: 'alice', email: 'a@example.test', role: 'consumer' }]); expect(res.body[0].password).toBeUndefined(); + expect(res.body[0].verificationCode).toBeUndefined(); }); it('returns 500 when scan rejects', async () => { - mockScan.mockReturnValue({ - promise: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail')) - }); - + mockScan.mockReturnValue({ promise: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail')) }); const res = await request(app).get('/users'); - expect(mockScan).toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(res.status).toBe(500); }); }); describe('GET /keys', () => { - it('returns stored keys', async () => { - const sampleKeys = [ - { - id: 'k1', - key: 'abc', - userId: 'u1' - } - ]; + it('returns only non-secret key metadata', async () => { + const sampleKeys = [{ id: 'k1', userId: 'u1', issuedAt: '2026-01-01', usageCount: 1, expiresAt: '2027-01-01', key: 'secret-value' }]; mockScan.mockReturnValue({ promise: async () => ({ Items: sampleKeys }) }); - const res = await request(app).get('/keys'); - - expect(mockScan).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ TableName: 'Keys' }); + expect(mockScan).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ TableName: 'Keys', ProjectionExpression: expect.any(String) })); expect(res.status).toBe(200); - expect(res.body).toEqual(sampleKeys); + expect(res.body).toEqual([{ id: 'k1', userId: 'u1', issuedAt: '2026-01-01', usageCount: 1, expiresAt: '2027-01-01' }]); }); }); From d2a100e2695fa6dccdefa54f42593be8d3d8a420 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:39:14 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 60/83] test: exercise admin authorization in legacy route regression suite Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/__tests__/routes/admin.test.js | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/__tests__/routes/admin.test.js b/backend/__tests__/routes/admin.test.js index 47fd5997..f19f40b9 100644 --- a/backend/__tests__/routes/admin.test.js +++ b/backend/__tests__/routes/admin.test.js @@ -5,20 +5,21 @@ jest.mock('../../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ scan: jest.fn() })); const docClient = require('../../lib/dynamodbClient'); const adminRouter = require('../../routes/admin'); const app = express(); +app.use((req, _res, next) => { req.user = { userId: 'test-admin', role: 'admin' }; next(); }); app.use('/', adminRouter); describe.each([ - { route: 'users', table: 'Users', item: { id: 'u1', username: 'Alice' } }, - { route: 'keys', table: 'Keys', item: { id: 'k1', key: 'abc' } }, -])('admin GET /$route', ({ route, table, item }) => { + { route: 'users', table: 'Users', item: { id: 'u1', username: 'Alice', email: 'alice@example.test', role: 'consumer' }, expected: { id: 'u1', username: 'Alice', email: 'alice@example.test', role: 'consumer' } }, + { route: 'keys', table: 'Keys', item: { id: 'k1', userId: 'u1', key: 'secret', usageCount: 2 }, expected: { id: 'k1', userId: 'u1', usageCount: 2 } }, +])('admin GET /$route', ({ route, table, item, expected }) => { beforeEach(() => docClient.scan.mockReset()); - test('returns stored records from the expected table', async () => { + test('returns sanitized records from the expected table', async () => { docClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ promise: async () => ({ Items: [item] }) }); const response = await request(app).get('/' + route); expect(response.status).toBe(200); - expect(response.body).toEqual([item]); - expect(docClient.scan).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ TableName: table }); + expect(response.body).toEqual([expected]); + expect(docClient.scan).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ TableName: table, ProjectionExpression: expect.any(String) })); }); test('returns 500 on a storage error', async () => { From 21154daf1d90c499999772ac71f160eb7bd226ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:39:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 61/83] test: verify signed federation sync and reject invalid peers Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- .../__tests__/federationSyncJob.test.js | 71 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/__tests__/federationSyncJob.test.js b/backend/federation/__tests__/federationSyncJob.test.js index 5b821fb1..57999c6c 100644 --- a/backend/federation/__tests__/federationSyncJob.test.js +++ b/backend/federation/__tests__/federationSyncJob.test.js @@ -7,46 +7,89 @@ jest.mock('../../lib/dynamodbClient', () => ({ const axios = require('axios'); const dynamodbClient = require('../../lib/dynamodbClient'); +const { createPeerResponseHeaders } = require('../../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); const runFederationSync = require('../federationSyncJob'); describe('runFederationSync', () => { + const originalEnv = { + nodeId: process.env.NODE_ID, + localNodeId: process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID, + outbound: process.env.FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON + }; + const peerSecret = '0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef'; + beforeEach(() => { jest.clearAllMocks(); + process.env.NODE_ID = 'local-node'; + process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID = 'local-node'; + process.env.FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON = JSON.stringify({ 'peer-1': peerSecret }); + }); + + afterAll(() => { + if (originalEnv.nodeId === undefined) delete process.env.NODE_ID; + else process.env.NODE_ID = originalEnv.nodeId; + if (originalEnv.localNodeId === undefined) delete process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID; + else process.env.FEDERATION_LOCAL_NODE_ID = originalEnv.localNodeId; + if (originalEnv.outbound === undefined) delete process.env.FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON; + else process.env.FEDERATION_OUTBOUND_PEERS_JSON = originalEnv.outbound; }); - it('updates lastSyncAt on successful sync', async () => { + it('verifies peer response signatures before importing and updates lastSyncAt', async () => { dynamodbClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ - promise: () => Promise.resolve({ Items: [{ url: 'http://node1.com' }] }) + promise: async () => ({ Items: [{ nodeId: 'peer-1', url: 'https://node1.example' }] }) }); - dynamodbClient.update.mockReturnValue({ - promise: () => Promise.resolve() + dynamodbClient.update.mockReturnValue({ promise: async () => ({}) }); + const data = { users: [] }; + const body = JSON.stringify(data); + axios.get.mockResolvedValue({ + data, + headers: createPeerResponseHeaders({ + nodeId: 'peer-1', secret: peerSecret, method: 'GET', path: '/federation/export', body + }) }); - axios.get.mockResolvedValue({ data: { foo: 'bar' } }); - axios.post.mockResolvedValue({}); await runFederationSync(); + expect(axios.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('https://node1.example/federation/export', expect.objectContaining({ + headers: expect.objectContaining({ + 'x-federation-node-id': 'local-node', + 'x-federation-signature': expect.any(String) + }), + timeout: 15000 + })); expect(dynamodbClient.update).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); const params = dynamodbClient.update.mock.calls[0][0]; expect(params).toMatchObject({ - Key: { url: 'http://node1.com' }, + Key: { url: 'https://node1.example' }, UpdateExpression: 'set lastSyncAt = :time', - ExpressionAttributeValues: { - ':time': expect.any(String) - } + ExpressionAttributeValues: { ':time': expect.any(String) } }); const timestamp = params.ExpressionAttributeValues[':time']; expect(new Date(timestamp).toISOString()).toBe(timestamp); }); - it('does not update lastSyncAt on failed sync', async () => { + it('does not import or update metadata when the peer response signature is invalid', async () => { dynamodbClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ - promise: () => Promise.resolve({ Items: [{ url: 'http://node1.com' }] }) + promise: async () => ({ Items: [{ nodeId: 'peer-1', url: 'https://node1.example' }] }) + }); + axios.get.mockResolvedValue({ + data: { users: [] }, + headers: { + 'x-federation-response-node-id': 'attacker', + 'x-federation-response-timestamp': String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)), + 'x-federation-response-signature': '0'.repeat(64) + } }); - axios.get.mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail')); - await runFederationSync(); + expect(dynamodbClient.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + it('does not send credentials to non-HTTPS production peers', async () => { + dynamodbClient.scan.mockReturnValue({ + promise: async () => ({ Items: [{ nodeId: 'peer-1', url: 'http://node1.example' }] }) + }); + await runFederationSync(); + expect(axios.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(dynamodbClient.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); }); }); From 85abdb87a174cba7ccddf0af275b0bb2cac1751d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:40:02 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 62/83] security: sanitize admin key records with explicit output allowlist Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/admin.js | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/admin.js b/backend/routes/admin.js index be52347e..29985707 100644 --- a/backend/routes/admin.js +++ b/backend/routes/admin.js @@ -6,6 +6,14 @@ const requireAdmin = require('../middleware/requireAdmin'); const { userWriteRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); const router = express.Router(); +function sanitizeKeyForAdmin(key = {}) { + const safe = {}; + for (const field of ['id', 'userId', 'issuedAt', 'usageCount', 'expiresAt']) { + if (key[field] !== undefined) safe[field] = key[field]; + } + return safe; +} + // Every route in this module requires a verified administrator account token. router.use(requireAdmin); router.use(userWriteRateLimit); @@ -30,7 +38,7 @@ router.get('/keys', async (_req, res) => { ProjectionExpression: '#id, userId, issuedAt, usageCount, expiresAt', ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } }).promise(); - res.json(keys); + res.json(keys.map(sanitizeKeyForAdmin)); } catch { res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch keys' }); } From 41b11df01dbc457d6239e111c1b19f38848b5f65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:40:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 63/83] fix: expose throttled account signup and login before API-key middleware Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/server.js | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js index afecab03..9c1aeccc 100644 --- a/backend/server.js +++ b/backend/server.js @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ global.emitToken = (conversationId, id, token) => sendConversationEvent(conversa global.emitMessage = (conversationId, message) => sendConversationEvent(conversationId, 'message', { message }); // Federation authenticates with per-peer HMAC credentials, independently of browser API keys. if (!minimal) tryMount('/federation', './federation/federationRoutes'); +// Public account creation/login have their own IP throttles and do not require the browser integration key. +if (!minimal) tryMount('/api/auth', './routes/authRoutes'); app.use(authMiddleware); app.use(apiRateLimit); // Private uploads are disabled until conversation-owner authorization is deployed (#191). @@ -34,7 +36,7 @@ app.use('/uploads', (_req, res) => res.status(410).json({ error: 'Attachment dow app.use('/api/location', locationRateLimit); let runFederationSync; if (!minimal) { - [['/', './routes/api'], ['/api/auth', './routes/authRoutes'], ['/api/keys', './routes/keyRoutes'], ['/api/contracts', './routes/contracts'], ['/api/admin', './routes/admin'], ['/api/marketplace', './marketplace/marketplace_routes'], ['/users', './routes/userRoutes'], ['/products', './routes/products'], ['/broadcast', './routes/broadcastRoutes'], ['/sms', './routes/smsRoutes'], ['/cart', './routes/cartRoutes'], ['/orders', './routes/orderRoutes'], ['/subscriptions', './routes/subscriptionRoutes'], ['/conversations', './routes/conversationRoutes'], ['/messages', './routes/communicationRoutes'], ['/inventory', './routes/inventoryRoutes'], ['/api/location', './routes/locationRoutes'], ['/trends', './trends/trendsRoutes']].forEach(([route, mod]) => tryMount(route, mod)); + [['/', './routes/api'], ['/api/keys', './routes/keyRoutes'], ['/api/contracts', './routes/contracts'], ['/api/admin', './routes/admin'], ['/api/marketplace', './marketplace/marketplace_routes'], ['/users', './routes/userRoutes'], ['/products', './routes/products'], ['/broadcast', './routes/broadcastRoutes'], ['/sms', './routes/smsRoutes'], ['/cart', './routes/cartRoutes'], ['/orders', './routes/orderRoutes'], ['/subscriptions', './routes/subscriptionRoutes'], ['/conversations', './routes/conversationRoutes'], ['/messages', './routes/communicationRoutes'], ['/inventory', './routes/inventoryRoutes'], ['/api/location', './routes/locationRoutes'], ['/trends', './trends/trendsRoutes']].forEach(([route, mod]) => tryMount(route, mod)); try { runFederationSync = require('./federation/federationSyncJob'); } catch (err) { console.warn('Federation sync disabled: ' + err.message); } } const PORT = process.env.PORT || 5000; From 3c78d9a68ecdd355ab075cf211b0fe6817a2aaff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:40:35 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 64/83] security: rate limit public registration and login attempts by source IP Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/authRoutes.js | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/authRoutes.js b/backend/routes/authRoutes.js index 78bfe4af..876b2b39 100644 --- a/backend/routes/authRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/authRoutes.js @@ -5,11 +5,22 @@ const { USER_TABLE_NAME, createUserItem, sanitizeUserForAuth } = require('../mod const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); const { randomUUID } = require('node:crypto'); const router = express.Router(); +const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); + +const authRateLimit = rateLimit({ + windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, + limit: 20, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts. Try again later.' } +}); + try { require('dotenv').config(); } catch { /* Environment may be supplied by the process. */ } router.get('/test', (_req, res) => res.status(200).json({ message: 'Auth routes are working!' })); -router.post('/register', async (req, res) => { +router.post('/register', authRateLimit, async (req, res) => { try { const { username, email, phone, password } = req.body || {}; if (typeof username !== 'string' || !username.trim() || @@ -35,7 +46,7 @@ router.post('/register', async (req, res) => { } }); -router.post('/login', async (req, res) => { +router.post('/login', authRateLimit, async (req, res) => { try { const { email, password } = req.body || {}; if (typeof email !== 'string' || typeof password !== 'string') { From e82597a53703cc61a7c4f35d3f773721c7f6cfa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:41:23 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 65/83] test: update federation import regression to authenticated provenance contract Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/sync/importHelper.test.js | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/sync/importHelper.test.js b/backend/sync/importHelper.test.js index d45c600f..a0e5f9e9 100644 --- a/backend/sync/importHelper.test.js +++ b/backend/sync/importHelper.test.js @@ -3,14 +3,30 @@ const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); const docClient = require('../lib/dynamodbClient'); const { importFederatedData } = require('./importHelper'); -test('imports listings, transactions, and users into their DynamoDB tables', async () => { +test('imports listings and transactions and conditionally creates sanitized federated users', async () => { const calls = []; - docClient.put = (params) => ({ promise: async () => calls.push(params) }); - const data = { listings: [{ id: 'l1' }], transactions: [{ id: 't1' }], users: [{ id: 'u1' }] }; - await importFederatedData(data); + docClient.put = params => ({ promise: async () => calls.push(params) }); + const data = { + listings: [{ id: 'l1' }], + transactions: [{ id: 't1' }], + users: [{ id: 'u1', username: 'remote-user', password: 'must-not-import', role: 'admin', verified: true }] + }; + await importFederatedData(data, { sourceNodeId: 'authenticated-peer' }); assert.deepEqual(calls, [ { TableName: 'Listings', Item: data.listings[0] }, { TableName: 'Transactions', Item: data.transactions[0] }, - { TableName: 'Users', Item: data.users[0] }, + { + TableName: 'Users', + Item: { + id: 'u1', + username: 'remote-user', + sourceNodeId: 'authenticated-peer', + remoteUserId: 'u1', + originNodeId: 'authenticated-peer', + originUserId: 'u1' + }, + ConditionExpression: 'attribute_not_exists(#id)', + ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#id': 'id' } + } ]); }); From 709fd2f9d0fd5f43b9d9b1b9ce4f4197ff45d3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:42:23 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 66/83] security: bind rate limiting to every conversation route handler Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index 1a2c67b4..11a3ec11 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -13,11 +13,10 @@ const chatLimiter = rateLimit({ keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId ? 'account:' + req.user.userId : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }); -router.use(auth, chatLimiter); -router.post('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); -router.get('/', asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); -router.put('/:id', asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); -router.delete('/:id', asyncHandler(ctrl.remove)); -router.post('/:id/pin', asyncHandler(ctrl.pin)); +router.post('/', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); +router.get('/', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); +router.put('/:id', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); +router.delete('/:id', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.remove)); +router.post('/:id/pin', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.pin)); module.exports = router; From 1b659d9c71bfcf153c618cff950371d72f0ef328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:42:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 67/83] security: bind rate limiting to every message route handler Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 5c371ffb..5199937f 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ const chatLimiter = rateLimit({ keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId ? 'account:' + req.user.userId : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }); -router.use(auth, chatLimiter); -router.post('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); -router.get('/:conversationId', asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); +router.post('/:conversationId', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); +router.get('/:conversationId', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); module.exports = router; From fae72a2f605b14a9f32865a4f9ab055cb18b368a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:03 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 68/83] security: require account bearer identity for private chat APIs Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/chatAuth.js | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/chatAuth.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/chatAuth.js b/backend/middleware/chatAuth.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a6ad99c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/chatAuth.js @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken'); + +// A shared integration key does not identify an individual chat participant. +module.exports = (req, res, next) => { + const header = req.headers.authorization; + if (!header || !header.startsWith('Bearer ')) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Account bearer token required' }); + } + try { + const payload = jwt.verify(header.slice(7), process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] }); + if (typeof payload.userId !== 'string' || !payload.userId.trim()) { + throw new Error('Missing account identity'); + } + req.user = payload; + res.set('Cache-Control', 'private, no-store'); + return next(); + } catch { + return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized: Invalid Token' }); + } +}; From 9a4c5e7a1ca0f0c372fa8cb9e51d5737068e0070 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 69/83] security: deny API-key-only access to private conversations Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index 11a3ec11..1cadb9ff 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ const express = require('express'); const router = express.Router(); -const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); +const auth = require('../middleware/chatAuth'); const ctrl = require('../controllers/conversation_controller'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); From c14ffc8c16d0e8e90e3db301d3d8f16d55db95bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 70/83] security: deny API-key-only access to private messages Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 5199937f..2ab73bda 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ const express = require('express'); const router = express.Router(); const commController = require('../controllers/communication_controller'); -const auth = require('../middleware/authMiddleware'); +const auth = require('../middleware/chatAuth'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); From c342c9bee498977c7e2986ad27ce4e390b7bf82e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:13 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 71/83] security: add IP-based federation authentication attempt budget Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/rateLimit.js | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js index 1a5bc547..9fdf2315 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js +++ b/backend/middleware/rateLimit.js @@ -61,5 +61,6 @@ module.exports = { locationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:location', limit: 30, message: 'Too many location requests' }), chatRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:chat', limit: 60, message: 'Too many chat requests' }), streamRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:stream', limit: 20, message: 'Too many stream requests' }), + federationAttemptRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:federation-attempt', limit: 20, message: 'Too many federation authentication attempts' }), federationRateLimit: createRequestLimiter({ prefix: 'agrinet:federation', limit: 30, message: 'Too many federation requests' }) }; From b829bde7c4343a724ef6d759b944131576bbf2dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 72/83] security: throttle federation requests before and after peer authentication Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/federation/federationRoutes.js | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js index 611733d3..2afe333e 100644 --- a/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/federation/federationRoutes.js @@ -6,14 +6,14 @@ const { TRANSACTION_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/transaction'); const { USER_TABLE_NAME } = require('../models/user'); const { importFederatedData } = require('../sync/importHelper'); const { requireFederationPeer, createPeerResponseHeaders } = require('../middleware/federationPeerAuth'); -const { federationRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); +const { federationAttemptRateLimit, federationRateLimit } = require('../middleware/rateLimit'); const pick = (item, fields) => Object.fromEntries( fields.filter(field => item[field] !== undefined).map(field => [field, item[field]]) ); // Browser API keys and ordinary member tokens are never federation credentials. -router.use(requireFederationPeer, federationRateLimit); +router.use(federationAttemptRateLimit, requireFederationPeer, federationRateLimit); router.get('/export', async (_req, res) => { try { From f738e14bdebca5abaf65d123a0c0602c9caaa9de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 73/83] test: ensure shared API keys cannot access private chat endpoints Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js diff --git a/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js b/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42d0fc4f --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +const express = require('express'); +const request = require('supertest'); +const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken'); +const chatAuth = require('../chatAuth'); + +describe('private chat authentication', () => { + const prior = process.env.JWT_SECRET; + beforeAll(() => { process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'chat-auth-test-secret'; }); + afterAll(() => { + if (prior === undefined) delete process.env.JWT_SECRET; + else process.env.JWT_SECRET = prior; + }); + + function app() { + const server = express(); + server.get('/private', chatAuth, (req, res) => res.json({ userId: req.user.userId })); + return server; + } + + test('rejects shared API-key-only requests', async () => { + const response = await request(app()).get('/private').set('x-api-key', 'browser-key'); + expect(response.status).toBe(401); + }); + + test('rejects missing and invalid bearer tokens', async () => { + expect((await request(app()).get('/private')).status).toBe(401); + expect((await request(app()).get('/private').set('Authorization', 'Bearer invalid')).status).toBe(401); + }); + + test('accepts a signed account token and sets its principal', async () => { + const token = jwt.sign({ userId: 'member-1', role: 'consumer' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '5m' }); + const response = await request(app()).get('/private').set('Authorization', 'Bearer ' + token); + expect(response.status).toBe(200); + expect(response.body).toEqual({ userId: 'member-1' }); + }); +}); From 45eb5ae6861a36ad976559fba91c31799b5f0fa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:44:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 74/83] docs: document private chat identity and federation attempt limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/docs/security-hardening.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/docs/security-hardening.md b/backend/docs/security-hardening.md index 18ee4efd..9e6669ec 100644 --- a/backend/docs/security-hardening.md +++ b/backend/docs/security-hardening.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Exports use explicit field allowlists. The location feature's exact owner coordi ## Distributed request and connection limits -express-rate-limit is used for API, user writes, location, chat, stream and federation traffic. Authenticated requests are keyed by req.user.userId; authenticated peers by req.federationPeer.nodeId; application-key traffic without a user identity falls back to source IP. +express-rate-limit is used for API, user writes, location, chat, stream and federation traffic. Chat routes require an account JWT (`chatAuth`); the shared browser/API key is explicitly rejected for private chat. Authenticated requests are keyed by req.user.userId; authenticated peers by req.federationPeer.nodeId; application-key traffic without a user identity falls back to source IP. When REDIS_URL is configured, request counters and concurrent-stream reservations use Redis and are shared across instances. In a multi-instance deployment, set RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_REQUIRED=true so the service refuses to start without the shared store. Without Redis, counters and stream slots are process-local and suitable only for a documented single-instance deployment. From 68dda7aadddaba60d879efba91d0185c983fa4c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:46:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 75/83] test: expect shared API keys to be rejected by private chat routes Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js | 106 ++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js b/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js index 58a1ca07..b591f9e2 100644 --- a/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js +++ b/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js @@ -148,30 +148,35 @@ test('invalid keys are rejected before persistence or AI work', async () => { assert.equal(aiCalls, 0); }); -for (const apiCaller of [false, true]) { - test(`parallel ${apiCaller ? 'API-key' : 'JWT'} retries cannot acquire a second send while the first AI response is running`, async () => { - const auth = apiCaller ? { apiKey: process.env.API_KEY } : {}; - let started, finish; - const running = new Promise(resolve => { started = resolve; }); - const release = new Promise(resolve => { finish = resolve; }); - setClient({ chat: { completions: { create: async () => { - aiCalls++; - started(); - await release; - return (async function* () { yield { choices: [{ delta: { content: 'Ready' } }] }; })(); - } } } }); - const first = send(auth).then(response => response); - await running; - const racing = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => send(auth))); - finish(); - const done = await first; - assert.ok(racing.every(response => response.status === 409 && response.body.code === 'message_send_pending')); - assert.deepEqual((await send(auth)).body, done.body); - assert.equal(messages().length, 2); - assert.equal(aiCalls, 1); - assert.equal(emitted.length, 2); - }); -} +test('parallel JWT retries cannot acquire a second send while the first AI response is running', async () => { + let started, finish; + const running = new Promise(resolve => { started = resolve; }); + const release = new Promise(resolve => { finish = resolve; }); + setClient({ chat: { completions: { create: async () => { + aiCalls++; + started(); + await release; + return (async function* () { yield { choices: [{ delta: { content: 'Ready' } }] }; })(); + } } } }); + const first = send().then(response => response); + await running; + const racing = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => send())); + finish(); + const done = await first; + assert.ok(racing.every(response => response.status === 409 && response.body.code === 'message_send_pending')); + assert.deepEqual((await send()).body, done.body); + assert.equal(messages().length, 2); + assert.equal(aiCalls, 1); + assert.equal(emitted.length, 2); +}); + +test('shared API-key-only callers are rejected before message or AI work', async () => { + const response = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY }); + assert.equal(response.status, 401); + assert.equal(response.body.error, 'Account bearer token required'); + assert.equal(messages().length, 0); + assert.equal(aiCalls, 0); +}); test('completed receipts survive reloading the request handler', async () => { const first = await send(); @@ -203,59 +208,6 @@ test('changing sender label, recipient, type or attachment conflicts, without re assert.equal(aiCalls, 1); }); -test('API-key callers replay within their credential scope and do not share JWT receipts', async () => { - const first = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY }); - assert.deepEqual((await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY })).body, first.body); - const user = await send(); - assert.equal(user.status, 201); - assert.notEqual(user.body.message.id, first.body.message.id); - assert.equal(aiCalls, 2); -}); - -test('API-key receipts use the stable scrypt scope instead of a fast credential hash', async () => { - const first = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY }); - assert.equal(first.status, 201); - const [receipt] = db.tables.get('MessageSends').values(); - // Independent Python hashlib.scrypt fixture: password=test-only-api-key, - // salt=SHA256(JSON([message-send-api-key-v2, conversation-1, send-1])).hex, - // N=16384, r=8, p=5, dklen=32. Locks the durable replay namespace. - assert.equal(receipt.id, 'e54be044e9e970d309de6ebe2b3763f1cbb49c546d04c7379102ba52709867e6'); - assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(receipt).includes(process.env.API_KEY)); - delete require.cache[require.resolve('../services/retrySafeMessage')]; - delete require.cache[require.resolve('../controllers/communication_controller')]; - delete require.cache[require.resolve('../routes/communicationRoutes')]; - app = makeApp(); - assert.deepEqual((await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY })).body, first.body); - assert.equal(aiCalls, 1); -}); - -test('API-key rotation, conversation and send keys have separate retry scopes', async () => { - const first = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY }); - const otherConversation = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY, conversation: 'conversation-2' }); - const otherSend = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY, key: 'send-2' }); - process.env.API_KEY = 'rotated-test-api-key'; - const rotated = await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY }); - for (const response of [first, otherConversation, otherSend, rotated]) assert.equal(response.status, 201); - assert.equal(new Set([first, otherConversation, otherSend, rotated].map(response => response.body.message.id)).size, 4); - assert.deepEqual((await send({ apiKey: process.env.API_KEY })).body, rotated.body); - assert.equal(aiCalls, 4); -}); - -test('WIX API-key retries work without a JWT secret', async () => { - const priorWixKey = process.env.WIX_API_KEY; - delete process.env.API_KEY; - delete process.env.JWT_SECRET; - process.env.WIX_API_KEY = 'test-only-wix-api-key'; - try { - const first = await send({ apiKey: process.env.WIX_API_KEY }); - assert.equal(first.status, 201); - assert.deepEqual((await send({ apiKey: process.env.WIX_API_KEY })).body, first.body); - assert.equal(aiCalls, 1); - } finally { - if (priorWixKey === undefined) delete process.env.WIX_API_KEY; else process.env.WIX_API_KEY = priorWixKey; - } -}); - test('an invalid API-key header cannot alter a verified JWT retry scope', async () => { const first = await send(); const retry = await request(app).post('/messages/conversation-1') From dfd874df4c7cb92f8851a0cde75ae626f7675a95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:47:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 76/83] test: expect 401 for missing private chat account token Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js b/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js index b591f9e2..4eacb836 100644 --- a/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js +++ b/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ test('an invalid API-key header cannot alter a verified JWT retry scope', async }); test('authentication failures and JWTs without a stable user ID create no receipts', async () => { - assert.equal((await request(app).post('/messages/conversation-1').set('Idempotency-Key', 'key').send(payload)).status, 403); + assert.equal((await request(app).post('/messages/conversation-1').set('Idempotency-Key', 'key').send(payload)).status, 401); const noIdentity = await request(app).post('/messages/conversation-1') .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${jwt.sign({ role: 'member' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET)}`) .set('Idempotency-Key', 'key').send(payload); From c70162d18d99ac889003fc9324ba419a37b24b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:48:21 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 77/83] test: reject JWTs without user identity at chat auth boundary Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js b/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js index 4eacb836..be67bc7c 100644 --- a/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js +++ b/backend/__tests__/message_retries.test.js @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ test('authentication failures and JWTs without a stable user ID create no receip const noIdentity = await request(app).post('/messages/conversation-1') .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${jwt.sign({ role: 'member' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET)}`) .set('Idempotency-Key', 'key').send(payload); - assert.equal(noIdentity.status, 400); + assert.equal(noIdentity.status, 401); assert.equal(db.tables.size, 0); }); From e44782713a9ff70719d3797c93bbf22dd61aa5b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:50:40 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 78/83] security: inline per-account limiter on every conversation handler Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index 1cadb9ff..3edfc8a9 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -5,18 +5,55 @@ const ctrl = require('../controllers/conversation_controller'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -const chatLimiter = rateLimit({ +router.post('/', auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', legacyHeaders: false, - keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId ? 'account:' + req.user.userId : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } -}); -router.post('/', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); -router.get('/', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); -router.put('/:id', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); -router.delete('/:id', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.remove)); -router.post('/:id/pin', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(ctrl.pin)); +}), asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); +router.get('/', auth, rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}), asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); +router.put('/:id', auth, rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}), asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); +router.delete('/:id', auth, rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}), asyncHandler(ctrl.remove)); +router.post('/:id/pin', auth, rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}), asyncHandler(ctrl.pin)); module.exports = router; From 776ce4799a0394b8a5b3f5c77d27aa279fd1d46e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:50:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 79/83] security: inline per-account limiter on every message handler Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 2ab73bda..97bb77d5 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -5,15 +5,25 @@ const auth = require('../middleware/chatAuth'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -const chatLimiter = rateLimit({ +router.post('/:conversationId', auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', legacyHeaders: false, - keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId ? 'account:' + req.user.userId : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } -}); -router.post('/:conversationId', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); -router.get('/:conversationId', auth, chatLimiter, asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); +}), asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); +router.get('/:conversationId', auth, rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 120, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId + ? 'account:' + req.user.userId + : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } +}), asyncHandler(commController.listMessages)); module.exports = router; From 316181580b083e9d650904e9dee6ab6824bfbc66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:50:47 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 80/83] test: apply explicit rate limit to protected chat auth fixture Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js b/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js index 42d0fc4f..a3528614 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js +++ b/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ const express = require('express'); const request = require('supertest'); const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken'); const chatAuth = require('../chatAuth'); +const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); describe('private chat authentication', () => { const prior = process.env.JWT_SECRET; @@ -13,7 +14,7 @@ describe('private chat authentication', () => { function app() { const server = express(); - server.get('/private', chatAuth, (req, res) => res.json({ userId: req.user.userId })); + server.get('/private', chatAuth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60000, limit: 60, keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId || ipKeyGenerator(req.ip) }), (req, res) => res.json({ userId: req.user.userId })); return server; } From 9a84ea526e65bc4fce642a956d7a7db7c031c448 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:53:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 81/83] security: throttle chat requests by IP before JWT authorization Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js index 3edfc8a9..a89e5e8a 100644 --- a/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/conversationRoutes.js @@ -5,7 +5,14 @@ const ctrl = require('../controllers/conversation_controller'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -router.post('/', auth, rateLimit({ +router.post('/', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', @@ -15,7 +22,14 @@ router.post('/', auth, rateLimit({ : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }), asyncHandler(ctrl.create)); -router.get('/', auth, rateLimit({ +router.get('/', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', @@ -25,7 +39,14 @@ router.get('/', auth, rateLimit({ : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }), asyncHandler(ctrl.list)); -router.put('/:id', auth, rateLimit({ +router.put('/:id', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', @@ -35,7 +56,14 @@ router.put('/:id', auth, rateLimit({ : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }), asyncHandler(ctrl.rename)); -router.delete('/:id', auth, rateLimit({ +router.delete('/:id', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', @@ -45,7 +73,14 @@ router.delete('/:id', auth, rateLimit({ : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }), asyncHandler(ctrl.remove)); -router.post('/:id/pin', auth, rateLimit({ +router.post('/:id/pin', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', From 9a218f9a6e3ee0415865cd483873a8cb1bfb5307 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:53:13 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 82/83] security: throttle message requests by IP before JWT authorization Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js index 97bb77d5..8f058204 100644 --- a/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js +++ b/backend/routes/communicationRoutes.js @@ -5,7 +5,14 @@ const auth = require('../middleware/chatAuth'); const asyncHandler = require('../utils/asyncHandler'); const { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator } = require('express-rate-limit'); -router.post('/:conversationId', auth, rateLimit({ +router.post('/:conversationId', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', @@ -15,7 +22,14 @@ router.post('/:conversationId', auth, rateLimit({ : 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' } }), asyncHandler(commController.sendMessage)); -router.get('/:conversationId', auth, rateLimit({ +router.get('/:conversationId', rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, + limit: 300, + standardHeaders: 'draft-6', + legacyHeaders: false, + keyGenerator: req => 'ip:' + ipKeyGenerator(req.ip), + message: { error: 'Too many authentication attempts' } +}), auth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 1000, limit: 120, standardHeaders: 'draft-6', From 6b3e2fd3f35bc8313a6e91f21ad7cdeccf4794e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Calvin Secrest Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 11:53:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 83/83] test: mirror pre-auth and per-account chat rate limits Signed-off-by: Calvin Secrest --- backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js b/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js index a3528614..8b3472b9 100644 --- a/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js +++ b/backend/middleware/__tests__/chatAuth.test.js @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ describe('private chat authentication', () => { function app() { const server = express(); - server.get('/private', chatAuth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60000, limit: 60, keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId || ipKeyGenerator(req.ip) }), (req, res) => res.json({ userId: req.user.userId })); + server.get('/private', rateLimit({ windowMs: 60000, limit: 300, keyGenerator: req => ipKeyGenerator(req.ip) }), chatAuth, rateLimit({ windowMs: 60000, limit: 60, keyGenerator: req => req.user?.userId || ipKeyGenerator(req.ip) }), (req, res) => res.json({ userId: req.user.userId })); return server; }