IntraPilot is a JetBrains assistant for approved internal models and services under development. The inherited ProxyAI runtime still contains public-network paths. It is not approved for installation or use with confidential projects.
Only administrator-approved organization-hosted model endpoints may receive model requests. An optional Bitbucket connection may address only separately approved organization-hosted Bitbucket API endpoints. Bitbucket Cloud and public Bitbucket/Git/Atlassian endpoints are excluded. All other network destinations must be denied. No inference engine runs on the workstation. No telemetry, analytics, cloud provider, remote crash reporting, external agent, account service, or fallback is shipped.
A private IP address alone does not prove an approved or internal service. The deployment supplies exact approved destinations and model IDs, plus an outbound network policy. The model gateway must independently be confirmed to serve approved internal models without forwarding requests to public services.
The product is distributed for free and includes no paid-plugin license checks. Code/context sent to an approved internal model server remains inside the organization; this is not a promise that no code leaves the workstation. No source, prompts, credentials, tool output, statistics, or logs may be sent to a public service. Inspect complete source, generated code, transitive/native dependencies, and the final package for every destination and network path; literal URL search alone is not sufficient evidence.
Inline edit, inline completion, and next edit have independent persistent toggles, initially disabled. A disabled feature must not collect background context, dispatch a request, schedule later work, or apply an in-flight result. Completion requires an approved server/model with appropriate capability; no unsupported feature may silently switch model or provider. All other user-facing features also have independent persistent switches; disabling one suppresses its execution/requests and pending result application. User settings cannot disable required security/approval controls or widen administrator-approved destinations.
Token usage is local accounting, never telemetry. With usage recording enabled, persist only approved model ID, feature, UTC time, local request/attempt IDs, reported token counts, outcome and completeness. No prompts/source/responses, tool output, file paths, repository/server names, or credentials are recorded. The Usage dashboard makes no model, public-network, chart-CDN, or sync request. Recording off stops new usage persistence and backfill; existing records remain. Incomplete/missing usage and disabled-recording coverage are visible rather than represented as zero spend or complete lifetime/server-wide totals.
Bitbucket starts with read-only repositories/branches/commits/PRs/diffs. No push, merge, PR creation/comment, webhook, or remote write is included. Tokens are stored through IntelliJ PasswordSafe, scoped to the exact approved service, and excluded from model prompts, query strings, plain configuration, logs, exports, and redirect forwarding. Connection URLs and pagination links from responses are untrusted and must pass the same destination/path/method policy.
The plugin cannot sandbox the complete IDE process or arbitrary subprocesses. The first release excludes arbitrary shell execution, external agents, remote MCP, web fetching/search, automatic model downloads, and plugin-owned update requests. IDE run/debug tools that execute project code stay excluded unless an independent process/network isolation boundary is introduced and verified.
Marketplace installation/update traffic belongs to the host IDE. Public source hosting, build dependencies, and Marketplace upload belong to the development and distribution environment; they are not permitted product runtime egress. Offline deployments install an independently reviewed ZIP with host-IDE outbound traffic restricted separately.
config/security/STARTUP_BLOCKED causes Gradle settings evaluation to fail
before project tasks, dependency setup, packaging, signing, sandbox startup,
or publishing. There is no skip flag. After source/dependency conversion and
read-only source-boundary review, clear only STARTUP_BLOCKED to allow synthetic
tests, sandbox validation, and an unsigned validation ZIP. RELEASE_BLOCKED
continues blocking signing and publishing until complete runtime acceptance.
This allows acceptance evidence to be collected without permitting publication.
GitHub Actions is disabled for this fork.
Remove RELEASE_BLOCKED only after all of the following have evidence and review:
- All runtime network call sites and transitive libraries are inventoried.
- Public providers, telemetry, updater, downloads, and external tooling are removed from registration, source shipping, and the built distribution.
- One approved internal-model client enforces destination/model policy with no redirects, external DNS/proxy path, or provider fallback.
- Fresh installs, old settings, endpoint changes, missing/deleted models, network failures, and agent/subagent routing all fail closed.
- Local tools enforce project boundaries and do not execute arbitrary code.
- Tests use synthetic repositories and synthetic model traffic only.
- A real IntelliJ sandbox is observed during startup, idle, chat, edit, agent tools, retries, configuration migration, and delayed activity, plus Bitbucket reads/paging, token rotation/removal, service switching, and inline toggle changes during active requests. Use synthetic content and test credentials against an approved internal test service. Observe both model and Bitbucket requests; auth headers must never reach the model or another origin. No plugin connection targets an unapproved destination, including DNS and subprocesses.
- A representative deployment enforces outbound denial independently of the plugin and verifies the internal gateway does not forward requests externally.
- The reviewed package passes license review and JetBrains Plugin Verifier.
- Independent inline toggles are tested across restart, disable during an in-flight request, and model capability/configuration changes.
- Internal Bitbucket auth/read-only operations are tested with synthetic fixtures, denied destinations, token redaction, paging links, redirects, and missing/expired/revoked tokens. Actual internal hosting is confirmed locally before deployment; no production token or content is used here.
- Independent switches suppress each feature, background/in-flight work, and dependent subagent/tool execution without weakening mandatory security rules. A retained-action inventory covers UI/context collectors and both chat and agent tool routes, including Read/search/diagnostics/Edit/Write/task tracking and overlapping inline/auto-apply mutation paths.
- Usage recording/aggregation survives concurrent requests, retries, duplicate or partial streaming events, cancellation, and IDE restart without double counting or fabricated zero/total counts. With recording disabled, totals remain stable and coverage is marked incomplete.
- Usage storage, graphs, and tables are checked for secret/content leakage and observed in the IntelliJ sandbox to create no network traffic. Filtered totals match charts/tables and timezone boundaries are explicit.
Passing scripts/verify-bootstrap.py proves only the repository foundation.
It does not prove any item in the runtime release checklist.