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Security: LLCForge/Beacon

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Beacon runs close to network infrastructure, so we take security reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.

Supported versions

Version Supported
Latest release Yes
main branch Yes (best effort)
Older releases No, please upgrade

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for security problems.

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

  1. Go to https://github.com/LLCForge/Beacon/security/advisories/new.
  2. Describe the issue, affected version or commit, and steps to reproduce.
  3. Include a proof of concept if you have one. Strip any real customer data, IP addresses or credentials from captures and logs.

What to expect:

  • Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
  • An initial assessment and severity rating within 10 business days.
  • A fix or mitigation plan, coordinated disclosure date, and credit in the advisory (unless you prefer to stay anonymous).

In scope

  • Secret leakage: webhook/HMAC secrets, bot tokens, SMTP credentials, PagerDuty/Opsgenie keys appearing in logs, alerts, errors or the persistent queue.
  • Injection through alert fields into Telegram HTML, Slack/Discord/Teams payloads, e-mail headers (header injection) or syslog frames.
  • Webhook signature bypass or replay (HMAC verification, timestamp window).
  • Authentication bypass on the silences, reload or health APIs.
  • Persistent queue corruption, unbounded growth or crash on a torn / hostile queue file.
  • Dependency vulnerabilities reachable from Beacon's code paths. Because every LLCForge tool vendors Beacon, a Beacon advisory is coordinated across all six tools.

Out of scope

  • Vulnerabilities in third-party services or protocols themselves (report those upstream).
  • Issues that require an attacker to already control the host or the config file.
  • Denial of service by volumetric flooding of the network the tool runs on.

Attack surface

Surface Default Protection
BMP collector 0.0.0.0:11019 source allowlist, 128 KiB message cap, bounded channel
Passive BGP listener off (collector.bgp) peer address allowlist, ASN check, hold timer, 64 KiB message cap; no TCP-MD5
Route API + web UI 127.0.0.1:8180 read-only, optional bearer token, CSP / nosniff / DENY framing, 64 concurrent requests, 10 s timeout, result caps
Management (/metrics, health, silences, reload) off until [metrics] listen is set silences / reload need bearer tokens; metrics and health are unauthenticated
Notary client off until [notary] is set outbound only, no redirects, timeout, response size / value checks
MRT import, relationship file local files size caps (16 MiB per MRT record, 256 MiB relationship file), skip-on-error

Hardening recommendations

  • Run as an unprivileged user; grant only the capabilities the tool needs (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE only if the passive BGP listener uses port 179).
  • Bind the management and API listeners to localhost or a management network, and set api.token_env when the API is reachable by others.
  • Restrict the BMP and BGP ports to your routers with a firewall; the passive BGP session has no TCP-MD5.
  • Keep secrets in environment variables or your secret manager, never in the config file or in version control.

There aren't any published security advisories