Skip to content

Security: Vedant-Git-dev/Aether

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

Only the latest commit on main is supported. There are no maintained release branches and no backports.

Threat model

Protected: stored history (messages, files, derived memory) is encrypted with AES-256-GCM before it is written to Postgres. A database-level compromise, such as a leaked backup or a breached storage provider, yields ciphertext rather than content. Encrypted values are bound to their table, column, and row id, so moving a ciphertext to another row fails to decrypt.

Not protected: compromise of the server process itself. The content key lives in the server's environment (AETHER_ENCRYPTION_KEY), so an attacker who owns the process can read the store. Moving the key to a dedicated secrets manager is planned.

Not protected: inference-time exposure at the configured model provider. Prompts, recent context, tool results, and files included in a perception call reach that provider. Choose a provider and retention policy you accept.

Not protected: a compromised connected app or a stolen OAuth token. Scope grants and bot permissions to the minimum you need, and disconnect apps you no longer use.

Not protected: multi-tenant isolation. AETHER_TOKEN is a single shared secret for the API, web chat, and companion. Aether is designed for one owner.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository: open a private advisory.

Include reproduction steps, the affected component, and the version or commit you tested. You will hear back within a few days. Please give a reasonable window to fix the issue before publishing details.

Operational guidance

  • Use a long random AETHER_TOKEN and serve Aether behind TLS.
  • Keep AETHER_ENCRYPTION_KEY and AETHER_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY out of the repository and out of database backups.
  • Back up the encryption key separately from the database. A backup without the key is unreadable.
  • Rotate provider token keys with python -m aether.providers.rotate_tokens --check.
  • Review the audit chain with /verify after restoring a backup.
  • Run integration tests only against a scratch database. The suite truncates tables.

There aren't any published security advisories