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kv: pin Phase-D TSO issuance invariants - #1250
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Acts on docs/design/2026_08_29_proposed_tso_batch_slot_claims.md, whose purpose was to get a tradeoff decided. The decision: Phase D stays batched. §3.1 (batch size 1) would put a Raft round trip on every Next(), which CLAUDE.md names as the invariant batching exists to preserve, and it buys a window that narrows rather than closes. §3.2 remains the fix and needs its own proposal, because a claim record is a wire/on-disk decision. Two decision-independent pieces land here. §3.3 for Internal.Forward. It was the only forward outside adminTokenProtectedMethod while ForwardAdminProposal and ForwardLeaseRead were both inside it, so it was the cheapest route to the durable-timestamp validation path for anything with peer-port reach. Both halves ship together: the server gate, and the peer token on the outbound write forward -- protecting the method without attaching the credential would have broken every forwarded write instead of authenticating it. An empty token attaches nothing and disables enforcement, so an unconfigured cluster behaves exactly as before on both ends. The §6 invariants that hold whichever option eventually lands: issuance is unique across concurrent allocators, direct and batched, and strictly monotonic. OCC's conflict check is latestTS(key) > startTS, so two commits sharing a timestamp can each read the other as not-newer -- uniqueness is load-bearing, and it has to survive whatever the slot-claim work changes about validation. Deliberately not added: a test that an unclaimed slot inside a committed window is refused. It is not refused today; that is the hole, and asserting current behaviour would lock in the bug. RelayPublish, ExportRangeVersions, ImportRangeVersions and PromoteStagedVersions stay outside the gate for now: each needs the same two-sided treatment and their clients are built through the migration factory rather than here, so they are tracked rather than half-wired. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
📝 Walkthrough
Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Configured peer forwarding now sends an admin bearer token without transport encryption. Protect peer traffic with verified TLS or avoid sending credentials over plaintext before merging. Pre-merge checks |
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タイトルはPhase-DのTSO発行不変条件という実際の変更を示しています。ただし、主な変更であるInternal.Forwardの認証と転送トークンの追加を示していません。 |
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Actionable comments posted: 4
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/design/2026_08_29_proposed_tso_batch_slot_claims.md`:
- Around line 110-117: Update the §1 Exposure description to explicitly identify
the unauthenticated Internal.Forward state as pre-introduction or rewrite it in
the past tense, consistent with the implemented server gate and outbound
forwarding token described in §4a.
In `@kv/leader_proxy.go`:
- Line 265: Update LeaderProxy.forward so the bearer token is added only when
the peer connection uses TLS with certificate verification; otherwise omit the
authorization metadata for insecure connections. Preserve token forwarding for
authenticated TLS connections and align the check with GRPCConnCache.ConnFor and
its dial credentials.
In `@kv/tso_slot_claim_test.go`:
- Line 119: Extend the BatchAllocator test around batch.Next to verify strict
monotonicity, not only uniqueness: call BatchAllocator.Next sequentially using a
fresh fixture and assert each returned value is greater than the immediately
preceding value.
- Around line 67-69: Update both test sites in kv/tso_slot_claim_test.go at
lines 67-69 and 120-122: in the tests around Next, collect allocator errors
instead of continuing past them, then after waiting assert that no errors
occurred and that exactly goroutines * perWorker timestamps were issued.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
adapter/admin_grpc.goadapter/admin_grpc_test.godocs/design/2026_08_29_proposed_tso_batch_slot_claims.mdkv/leader_proxy.gokv/sharded_coordinator.gokv/sharded_coordinator_leader_test.gokv/tso_slot_claim_test.go
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Four of the five review findings were the same defect in different places: the tests asserted properties they could not actually observe. The allocation-floor test never reached the bound. ValidateDurableTimestamp refuses an inactive Phase D first, so on an unactivated fixture every timestamp was refused for the wrong reason and the assertion held with the bound deleted. It now activates Phase D, asserts a timestamp inside the committed window validates -- which is what makes the two refusals about the bound rather than the state -- and pins ErrTSOTimestampInvalid rather than any error at all. Both concurrency tests discarded allocator errors with a bare continue. Uniqueness over whatever happened to succeed is satisfied by a single timestamp, so a fixture failing almost every call still looked like a passing property. They now collect the errors, require none, and require exactly goroutines*perWorker issued values. The batched test drove eight goroutines through one BatchAllocator, whose refill mutex serialises every reservation and makes the interesting failure -- two node-local allocators handed overlapping windows -- unreachable. It now runs one allocator per goroutine over shared TSO state, which is the shape production has. Uniqueness alone accepts a window handed out backwards, so the batched path gets the ordering half too. Verified: reversing tryWindowAfter leaves the uniqueness test passing and fails the new monotonic one. Worth recording for whoever changes reservation next: uniqueness is guarded twice, by the allocator's reservation mutex and by the HLC's CAS. Removing either alone leaves every test passing; both had to go before the multi-allocator test failed, and even then it caught it 3 runs in 6. Also documents the two properties of the Internal.Forward gate that review surfaced and that are not visible from the code: a node on an older binary does not attach the header, so every node must be upgraded before the gate can be relied on; and the token crosses the peer network in cleartext, because no peer dial in this process can be TLS. The gate is a barrier against reaching the peer port, not against observing it -- withholding the token on an insecure connection would disable it everywhere rather than harden it, so confidentiality is left to peer mTLS. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
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9 件すべて確認しました。テスト系 4 件はいずれも「主張している性質を実際には観測していない」という同じ欠陥で、指摘どおりです。 1. allocation floor の上限テスト (codex P2) — 指摘の機構が正確でした。 2. 並行テストのエラー握りつぶし (coderabbit) — 指摘どおりです。 3. BatchAllocator を複数にする (codex P2) — 指摘どおりです。単一 allocator では refill mutex が全予約を直列化するため、「複数のノードローカル allocator に重なった窓が渡る」という当該の失敗に到達できません。goroutine ごとに ただし正直に付記すると、この性質は二重に守られています。allocator 側の予約 mutex と HLC の CAS の両方です。片方だけ壊しても全テストが通り、両方壊して初めて multi-allocator テストが落ちました（6 回中 3 回）。単一 allocator 版より厳密に強いものの、単独の revert-check で落とせる性質ではありません。 4. BatchAllocator の厳密単調性 (coderabbit) — 指摘どおりです。 5. design doc のライフサイクル (codex P2 / P3, coderabbit) — 3 件とも対応しました。 6. ローリングアップグレード時のスキュー (codex P1) — 機構は正確です。admin token 設定済みクラスタでは、旧バイナリの follower はヘッダを付けないため、アップグレード済みノードがリーダーのとき当該 follower 経由の書き込みが 現状のまま出し、手順を明記する方針としました。理由は、これが 7. 平文での bearer token 送信 (coderabbit Major / CWE-319) — 機構は正確です。ただし提案された対策は採用しません。
また、トークンの隣を流れる Raft トラフィック自体が同じく平文であり、当該ネットワーク上の観測者はすでにそれを読み書きできます。つまりこのゲートが上げているのは「peer ポートに到達する」ハードルであって「観測する」ハードルではなく、それは §1 の exposure（durable-timestamp 検証パスへの未認証の到達）の正しい読み方でもあります。同じパターンは 機密性は peer mTLS で解くべきもので、別 PR として切り出します。この判断と根拠は 検証: |
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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 1m 46s —— View job Review
Scope reviewed: current HEAD ( Previously-raised findings — verified resolvedAll nine items the author replied to are genuinely fixed in
New findingStale filename references from the design-doc rename. The doc was correctly
All three say Other observations (no action needed)
Overall: the substantive review threads (test-tautology bugs, error-swallowing, single-allocator blind spot, monotonicity gap, doc lifecycle) are all correctly fixed with matching revert-checks, not just claimed fixed. Only the stale filename references are outstanding, and they're cosmetic. |
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🟢 Approval recommended
The authentication wiring and invariant coverage are sound; remaining findings are minor documentation corrections.
4 open findings
What changed in this PR
Authenticates peer write forwarding while preserving batched TSO issuance and documenting deferred durable slot claims.
Changes:
- Gates
Internal.Forwardwith the admin token and attaches it to forwarded writes. - Adds TSO uniqueness, monotonicity, and validation-boundary tests.
- Promotes the TSO slot-claims design to partial status.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
adapter/admin_grpc.go |
Protects Internal.Forward. |
adapter/admin_grpc_test.go |
Tests forwarding-method classification. |
kv/leader_proxy.go |
Attaches bearer credentials to forwarded writes. |
kv/sharded_coordinator.go |
Adds peer-forward token naming. |
kv/sharded_coordinator_leader_test.go |
Tests forwarded-write credentials. |
kv/tso_slot_claim_test.go |
Adds TSO invariant tests. |
docs/design/2026_08_29_proposed_tso_batch_slot_claims.md |
Removes the superseded proposal. |
docs/design/2026_08_29_partial_tso_batch_slot_claims.md |
Records the decision and partial implementation. |
docs/design/2026_09_02_proposed_prephase_d_resolution_evidence.md |
Updates the related-design reference. |
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Summary
Keep Phase D batched and pin the timestamp issuance invariants in
kv/tso_slot_claim_test.go. The proposed durable per-slot claim remains the fix for the unclaimed-slot gap; this PR does not change allocation or validation behavior.The attempted
Internal.Forwardbearer-token gate was withdrawn after review. It would reject writes from older followers during a rolling upgrade, send the token over the current plaintext peer transport, and leave the legacy coordinator's forwarding path without a credential. The design document records these prerequisites for a separate, staged authentication change.Risk
The existing unauthenticated peer-forward path and unclaimed-slot validation gap remain open. This PR adds tests and documents the decision; it does not assert that either gap is closed.
Test evidence
go test ./kv -run 'Test.*(TSO|BatchAllocator|ForwardedWrite)' -count=1— pass.go test -race ./kv -run '^TestBatchAllocatorIssuesEachTimestampAtMostOnce$' -count=20— pass; each of eight allocators now has four concurrent callers.go test ./adapter -run 'TestAdminTokenAuth' -count=1— pass.golangci-lint --config=.golangci.yaml run --fix— 0 issues.Self-review