Describe the bug
When authenticating the built-in Slack MCP server ( mcp.slack.com ) via Copilot CLI, the generated OAuth consent URL requests the full superset of Slack scopes — including write scopes ( chat:write , files:write , channels:write , canvases:write , lists:write , reactions:write , im:write , mpim:write , groups:write ) — even though the session only exposes a small set of read-only tools:
• slack_read_channel
• slack_read_thread
• slack_list_channel_members
• slack_search_public
Example generated authorize URL (redacted):
https://slack.com/oauth/v2_user/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=REDACTED&state=REDACTED&code_challenge=REDACTED&code_challenge_method=S256&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A58672%2F&scope=canvases%3Aread+canvases%3Awrite+channels%3Ahistory+channels%3Aread+channels%3Awrite+chat%3Awrite+emoji%3Aread+files%3Aread+files%3Awrite+groups%3Ahistory+groups%3Aread+groups%3Awrite+im%3Ahistory+im%3Aread+im%3Awrite+lists%3Aread+lists%3Awrite+mpim%3Ahistory+mpim%3Aread+mpim%3Awrite+reactions%3Aread+reactions%3Awrite+search%3Aread.files+search%3Aread.im+search%3Aread.mpim+search%3Aread.private+search%3Aread.public+search%3Aread.users+users%3Aread+users%3Aread.email&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fmcp.slack.com%2F&prompt=select_account
Expected behavior
Actual behavior
Users are asked to grant far broader permissions (including message sending, file uploads, channel creation, list/canvas writes) than the tool set they can actually use, violating least-privilege expectations.
Suggested fix
• Scope the OAuth request dynamically to the active/allowed tool set, or
• Provide a config option (e.g. in mcp-config.json ) to restrict which scopes are requested for the built-in Slack MCP connection.
Affected version
1.0.87-0
Steps to reproduce the behavior
- Ensure the built-in Slack MCP server ( mcp.slack.com ) is available in Copilot CLI (no custom config needed — it's a first-party integration).
- In an interactive Copilot CLI session, run /mcp (or trigger any Slack-related request) so Copilot needs to authenticate with Slack.
- Confirm only a subset of read tools are currently exposed for the session, e.g. slack_read_channel , slack_read_thread , slack_list_channel_members , slack_search_public (visible via the tool list / <tools_changed_notice> or /mcp output).
- Trigger the OAuth flow (Copilot opens/prints an authorization URL and starts a local loopback listener, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:PORT/ ).
- Inspect the generated https://slack.com/oauth/v2_user/authorize?... URL's scope= query parameter.
- Observe: the scope parameter includes the full superset of Slack scopes — including write scopes ( chat:write , files:write , channels:write , canvases:write , lists:write , reactions:write , im:write , mpim:write , groups:write ) and additional read scopes ( users:read , users:read.email , emoji:read , search:read.private/mpim/im/files/users ) — none of which are required by the 4 tools actually exposed.
Expected behavior
The requested scope list should match only the tools actually enabled/exposed for the current session (or at minimum, be configurable), rather than always requesting the full write+read superset.
Describe the bug
When authenticating the built-in Slack MCP server ( mcp.slack.com ) via Copilot CLI, the generated OAuth consent URL requests the full superset of Slack scopes — including write scopes ( chat:write , files:write , channels:write , canvases:write , lists:write , reactions:write , im:write , mpim:write , groups:write ) — even though the session only exposes a small set of read-only tools:
• slack_read_channel
• slack_read_thread
• slack_list_channel_members
• slack_search_public
Example generated authorize URL (redacted):
https://slack.com/oauth/v2_user/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=REDACTED&state=REDACTED&code_challenge=REDACTED&code_challenge_method=S256&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A58672%2F&scope=canvases%3Aread+canvases%3Awrite+channels%3Ahistory+channels%3Aread+channels%3Awrite+chat%3Awrite+emoji%3Aread+files%3Aread+files%3Awrite+groups%3Ahistory+groups%3Aread+groups%3Awrite+im%3Ahistory+im%3Aread+im%3Awrite+lists%3Aread+lists%3Awrite+mpim%3Ahistory+mpim%3Aread+mpim%3Awrite+reactions%3Aread+reactions%3Awrite+search%3Aread.files+search%3Aread.im+search%3Aread.mpim+search%3Aread.private+search%3Aread.public+search%3Aread.users+users%3Aread+users%3Aread.email&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fmcp.slack.com%2F&prompt=select_account
Expected behavior
Actual behavior
Users are asked to grant far broader permissions (including message sending, file uploads, channel creation, list/canvas writes) than the tool set they can actually use, violating least-privilege expectations.
Suggested fix
• Scope the OAuth request dynamically to the active/allowed tool set, or
• Provide a config option (e.g. in mcp-config.json ) to restrict which scopes are requested for the built-in Slack MCP connection.
Affected version
1.0.87-0
Steps to reproduce the behavior
Expected behavior
The requested scope list should match only the tools actually enabled/exposed for the current session (or at minimum, be configurable), rather than always requesting the full write+read superset.