fix(native): run stock image processes in wrappers like Docker, naming refusals by roodboi · Pull Request #638 · hack-dance/hack

roodboi · 2026-11-07T02:31:49Z

Summary

Native's process wrappers now run stock images the way Docker does. Every setting a wrapper still cannot run is named by service and field, all at once and before any runtime state is reserved. Compose-declared cases are refused before the VM starts, and doctor predicts them.

Stacked on #636. The base is claude/hack-1938-alias-wrapper-diagnostics. After #636 merges, retarget this PR to next. Only the commits after 4d25fa5a belong to this PR: 516c7238 (the change) and 08f2d8c3. The second commit addresses the Codex finding: wrapper preflights in up and restart check only profile-active services, and doctor lists profile-gated services as information only.

Problem (HACK-1939 item 2)

Project-wide host aliases put a host-dependency release barrier around every service, and private environment values put a launcher around their services. Both refused stock images whose entrypoint or health-check executable is a bare name (docker-entrypoint.sh, CMD mysqladmin) with environment_entrypoint or environment_health. The refusals came one service per run, about 72 s each, without naming the service.

Runtime (runtime-core, Zig launcher, relay-guest)

Docker-style exec: the environment launcher (startup, health and exec modes) and the relay --await-release/--check-release barrier exec the selected process like Docker:
- a name containing / runs as given;
- a bare name is resolved through the container's own PATH after the environment is applied (Docker's default PATH when none is set);
- no host PATH is consulted and no shell runs.
Image process materialized for dependency services: the selected process now comes from the pinned image for host-dependency services as well, not only for private environment delivery. Before this change, a dependency-only service with no Compose entrypoint could not keep its image ENTRYPOINT behind the barrier.
Command-only and shell-form cases:
- A command-only image (no ENTRYPOINT) becomes the same argv.
- An explicit entrypoint: [] plus a command becomes that command.
- A CMD-SHELL or string health test becomes the exec form Docker runs: the image SHELL, or /bin/sh -c by default.
Refusals collected before reservation: every wrapped service is checked before the graph directory is created. A refusal keeps its code and adds a value-free process_refusals diagnostic {version: 1, refusals: [{service, field}]}. Fields are a closed set: entrypoint, healthcheck, user, stop_signal, mounts.

CLI

Pre-boot refusal: native up refuses, before the VM starts, the Compose-declared settings no wrapper can run, naming every service and field. These are an empty process, a health test without an executable, a named user, an unsupported stop signal, and a reserved volume target. Restart preflight runs the same check before stopping the current graph. Example:
- Native up cannot wrap these services' processes; nothing was started. Refused: service cache user (use a numeric UID or UID:GID); service shell user (use a numeric UID or UID:GID).
Runtime refusals named: runtime process_refusals are parsed in their closed form only, and named in the nothing-reserved startup report from fix(native): compile host aliases like execution and name unbound aliases #636.
Doctor: the native backend gains a native process wrappers check. It predicts the Compose-declared cases for every service native may wrap: all services when project-wide aliases exist, services with host-gateway extra hosts, and services with bare environment keys. Settings inherited from images are checked by the runtime against the pinned image.

Host proof

Candidate bundle built with scripts/build-native-candidate.sh from 516c7238. It ran with a fresh isolated HOME, HACK_HOME and native home, HACK_DAEMON_AUTOSTART_DISABLE=1, and one VM at a time. All fixtures were synthetic.

HACK-1938 alias-dup repro:
- Setup: extra_hosts: ["${UNSET_PREFIX:+x-}api.example.test:host-gateway"] plus internal.extra_hosts {api.example.test: host-gateway}, with a version 2 binding to a host listener.
- Result: ready in about 9 to 22 s. On next.10 the same setup failed with invalid_extra_hosts after about 146 s.
- Inside the container, wget http://api.example.test:8080/ returned the host page, and /etc/hosts holds exactly one api.example.test entry.
- up printed Native project ready (run …); Ctrl-C printed the confirmed-stop line and exited 130.
Stock redis:7.4-alpine with both wrappers:
- Setup: no Compose entrypoint, so the image's ENTRYPOINT ["docker-entrypoint.sh"] is used. The services carry a project-wide alias (relay barrier) and a managed env value (launcher). cache has health ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]; shell has the string health test "redis-cli ping".
- Both services were running/healthy in 13 s.
- Container PID 1 argv: /sbin/docker-init -- /run/hack-relay-guest --await-release <gen> -- /run/hack-environment-launcher … docker-entrypoint.sh redis-server.
- redis-cli ping returned PONG, the managed value was delivered (checked in-container, never printed), and the alias resolved to the host listener.
- Redis needed user: "999:1000": its entrypoint's root-to-redis setpriv handoff fails because native drops all capabilities. That is the existing native_data_owner_handoff_unqualified advisory and unrelated to this change.
Named user user: redis on both services:
- doctor warned in native process wrappers, naming both services.
- up refused in 0 s with the line above, and the pool stayed stopped.

Validation

Rust, run from a short-path worktree with cargo +1.97.1:

Gate	Result
`bun run check:local` (fmt and clippy `-D warnings`)	pass
clippy `-D warnings` with `environment-launcher,native-config-plan`	pass
relay-guest clippy	pass
`cargo test --lib graph::` with `environment-launcher,native-config-plan`	661 pass, 0 fail
`bun run test:local`	1194 pass, 1 fail

The one test:local failure is provider::resources::tests::explicit_root_binding_requires_exact_executable. It fails identically on a clean origin/next checkout on this host, so it is not caused by this change.

New Rust tests cover:

relative entrypoint and health argv preserved for PATH lookup;
command-only images;
empty-process refusal without partial mutation;
CMD-SHELL to exec-form conversion, including the image SHELL;
field-tagged launcher refusals;
the collector and its JSON contract.

TypeScript:

Focused bounded-runner tests: 185 pass, 0 fail across native-process-wrappers, native-project-process, native-project-start, native-project-restart, native-refusal-cli and native-compose-interpolation.
Doctor-related tests: 179 pass, 1 skipped, 1 fail. The failure, native-ca-doctor-cli "unknown owner", needs brew on PATH and fails identically without this change.
bun run --cwd packages/cli typecheck and bun run --cwd packages/cli check pass in a clean checkout outside /private/tmp.
Gitleaks finds nothing, staged or in history.
The full bun suite was not run locally; CI runs it.

Remaining gaps

Named users: a user name like postgres still cannot be wrapped, because private files need an exact UID. Native refuses it by name instead of guessing.
Unpredictable before boot: settings inherited from an image (a named image USER, an image with neither ENTRYPOINT nor CMD) are refused by the runtime with all services named, after the VM boots but before any reservation.
Artifact change: the relay guest artifact changes. I did not test restoring a graph retained by an older bundle with this bundle.

Refs HACK-1939

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…g refusals Project-wide host aliases put a host-dependency release barrier around every service, and private environment values put a launcher around their services. Both refused stock images whose entrypoint or health-check executable is a bare name (docker-entrypoint.sh, CMD mysqladmin), one service per run, without naming the service. Runtime: - The environment launcher and the relay release barrier exec the selected process like Docker: a name with "/" runs as given and a bare name is resolved through the container's own PATH (Docker's default when unset), never a host PATH and never a shell. - The selected process is materialized from the pinned image for host-dependency services too, not only for private environment delivery, so the barrier runs the image's ENTRYPOINT and CMD. A command-only image becomes the same argv, and a CMD-SHELL health check becomes the exec form Docker runs (the image SHELL, /bin/sh -c by default). - Every wrapped service is checked before any runtime state is reserved. A refusal keeps its code and lists each service and closed field (entrypoint, healthcheck, user, stop_signal, mounts) in a new value-free process_refusals diagnostic. CLI: - Native up refuses Compose-declared settings no wrapper can run (empty process, a health test without an executable, a named user, an unsupported stop signal, a reserved volume target) before the VM starts, naming every service and field. Restart preflight checks the same before stopping the current graph. - Runtime process_refusals are parsed in their closed form and named in the startup failure report. - Native doctor adds a "native process wrappers" check that predicts these cases for every service native may wrap. Refs HACK-1939 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

linear-code · 2026-11-07T02:31:55Z

HACK-1939

roodboi · 2026-11-07T02:32:01Z

@codex review

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-07T02:32:20Z

Codex Review Summary: ✅ Completed

This comment shows the latest Codex review activity on this pull request.

Review	Status	Commit	Review trigger
📝 Code Review	✅ Completed 2026-11-07T02:42:44.825113Z	`08f2d8c`	Manual request
🔒 Security Review	✅ Completed 2026-11-07T02:45:02.963422Z	`08f2d8c`	Manual request

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-07T02:38:24Z

🛡️ Codex Security Review · Automatically triggered

Security review completed. No security issues were found in this pull request.

Reviewed commit: 516c723811

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The wrapper preflight checked every authored service, so a service behind an unselected profile with an unsupported wrapper setting blocked the whole up and restart even though it never runs. Apply Compose profile activation before the check in the start and restart preflights. Doctor reports profile-gated services as information only and never warns on them. Refs HACK-1939 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-07T02:40:07Z

@codex review

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-07T02:42:43Z

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. More of your lovely PRs please.

Reviewed commit: 08f2d8c3eb

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-07T02:45:01Z

🛡️ Codex Security Review · Automatically triggered

Security review completed. No security issues were found in this pull request.

Reviewed commit: 08f2d8c3eb

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@codesmith-bot

## What this is Merge train batch 7 into `next`: three real-project trial fixes. Each component PR's reviewed head is merged with `git merge --no-ff`, in this order (#638 is stacked on #636). Integration conflicts are resolved in the batch's merge commits, described below. Hosted CI on this branch is the full-suite gate for the combined result. | PR | Title | Linear | Head included | Review at that head | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | #636 | fix(native): compile host aliases like execution and name unbound aliases | HACK-1939 | `4d25fa5a` | Codex code + security: no findings; 0 open threads | | #638 | fix(native): run stock image processes in wrappers like Docker, naming refusals | HACK-1939 | `08f2d8c3` | Codex code + security: no findings; 0 open threads | | #637 | fix(native): reconcile edited graphs that have a dependency cache | HACK-1937 | `592a9b1d` | Codex code + security: no findings (the security review confirms the cache-poisoning fix); 0 open threads; real-VM proof passed | ## Integration changes - **#636 with batches 1–6:** - The restart preflight and native `up` pass both #608's `dependencyOwners` and #636's `internalExtraHostSources`. - #615 and #636 both added a "nothing was reserved" startup report. They are now one `finalInspectionFailure`: #615's check plus #636's guards (a settled failure, not a restore, no mapping attempted), with the combined message "nothing was created and no cleanup is needed" followed by #615's diagnostic. - #636 matched `native_graph_unreserved`, but image projects inspect with `graph inspect`, which only returns `graph_unreserved`. #636's check therefore could never fire, so its tests now use `graph_unreserved`. - #636's ready summary and confirmed-stop line ride #611's progress events, so `up` prints one ready line, `Project is ready (SERVICES; run RUN). …`, with HTTPS URLs and published ports under it. Ctrl-C prints one stopped line, which states that data was retained when a run mapping was published. - **#638 with #615 / #622:** the error type keeps the fixed-message type and adds #638's process-refusal types. The unified startup report appends #638's named process refusals after the startup diagnostic. Doctor keeps the amd64 emulation and settings checks next to #638's process-wrapper check. - **#637 with #615 / #638:** failures keep the fixed message, service and process refusals, and add #637's `planChange`. Its guidance replaces "inspect owned state before retrying". The cache-poisoning fix holds in the merged code: - `dependency_cache.rs` is #637's file unchanged; - `plan_reconcile::ordinary_layout` still routes caches with a writable consumer through reconciliation; - no batch change mounts a cache volume outside `instance_scoped_volumes`. - **Size fix (`dbcf2bcc`):** the three error additions together pushed `CandidateError` past clippy's large-error bound. `cause_code` is now a boxed `str`, and process refusals and the plan change share one boxed, flat-serialized `RefusalDiagnostics`. A test pins the size and the JSON shape. - **#640** (credential-helper EPIPE race fix) was folded into batch 6, so it is not listed here. ## Validation on this branch (`458e0a93`) - Clean CLI typecheck: pass. Biome on changed files: no errors. - `RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN=1.97.1 bun run check:local`: pass. All-features clippy `-D warnings` (Zig 0.15.2): pass. - Cargo `--lib`: 1375 pass. `--features native-config-plan` `provider::graph`: 688 pass. Contracts: `project_contract` 66, `compose_fields_contract` 10, `interpolation_budget_contract` 1, `local_contract` 14. - `bun run test:models` (TLA+ 1.7.4): exit 0, 177 controls verified. - Focused bun tests, bounded runner, the changed test files: 260 pass, 0 fail. - `docs:prepare` + `docs:check`, `privacy:check`, gitleaks over `origin/next..HEAD`: pass. Not run locally: the full bun suite, the Linux cargo jobs, docker-e2e and native host qualification. Hosted CI covers the first three. After this merges, each component PR is closed with a link to the merge commit. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)  --- <a href="https://backend.blacksmith.sh/track/run-proof?expires=1796634294&installation_model_id=17053&pr_number=641&ref=codesmith_pr_footer&repository=hack-dance%2Fhack&return_to=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fhack-dance%2Fhack%2Fpull%2F641&variant=run_proof_on_this_pr&signature=daf0979b3cf0e8fb0d4344fa34460d87b7d75f22ce9fa22f3da3d8c483a575a9"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-run-proof-on-this-pr-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-run-proof-on-this-pr-light.svg"><img alt="Run Proof on this PR" src="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-run-proof-on-this-pr-dark-3x.png" width="168" height="28"></picture></a> <sup><a href="https://app.blacksmith.sh/hack-dance/codesmith/hack/pr/641?autoLogin=true&ref=codesmith_pr_footer">Open in [code]smith</a> · Need help on this PR? Tag <code>@codesmith-bot</code> with what you need.</sup>   --------- Co-authored-by: Dimitri Kennedy <344842+roodboi@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-07T10:01:33Z

Merged into next through the train batch PR #641 (squash commit 76460f8). This PR's reviewed head 08f2d8c3eb207a7393fe13326153cb7c85824b57 was included unchanged. #641 describes the integration resolutions. Closing as merged by batch; the branch is kept.

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roodboi mentioned this pull request Nov 7, 2026

fix(native): compile host aliases like execution and name unbound aliases #636

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Comment thread src/backends/native-project-start.ts Resolved

roodboi mentioned this pull request Nov 7, 2026

fix(native): merge train batch 7 (#636, #638, #637) #641

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fix(native): run stock image processes in wrappers like Docker, naming refusals - #638

fix(native): run stock image processes in wrappers like Docker, naming refusals#638
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Summary

Problem (HACK-1939 item 2)

Runtime (runtime-core, Zig launcher, relay-guest)

CLI

Host proof

Validation

Remaining gaps

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