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Security: killerdasher/TRACEFIELD

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately. Do not open a public GitHub issue for vulnerabilities that could put people or data at risk.

  • Preferred: GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability") on this repository.
  • Alternative: contact the maintainer via the email on the GitHub profile, with the subject line [TRACEFIELD security].

Include: affected version/commit, reproduction steps, impact, and any known workarounds. You will get an acknowledgement when the maintainer is available; there is no published response SLA — this is a small project and a fake SLA would be dishonest. You will be credited in the changelog unless you ask not to be.

Scope notes for this project

TRACEFIELD is a local-first tool: your case data stays on your machine. That shapes the threat model:

In scope

  • Path traversal or arbitrary file read/write via crafted case IDs, evidence filenames, or export paths.
  • SSRF bypasses: any URL that makes tracefield source add --fetch (or the username checker) connect to loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud-metadata addresses, including via DNS rebinding or redirects.
  • Terminal escape/ANSI injection that can hide or forge output when rendering untrusted source text, filenames, or tool output.
  • Secret leakage: redaction bypasses, evidence/export paths that write secrets un-redacted, or environment-variable values appearing in logs/reports.
  • Integrity failures: cases where evidence verify or case-verify reports OK for tampered bytes, or where the event hash chain verifies after a row was modified.
  • Dependency vulnerabilities with a demonstrated path to any of the above.

Out of scope (by design — not bugs)

  • The event hash chain is tamper-evident within this store's threat model only; a sufficiently privileged operator who rewrites every row can defeat it. This is documented in the code ("Not a blockchain").
  • SHA-256 evidence digests prove byte-level integrity, not truthfulness, authorship, or authenticity of content.
  • Third-party tools and providers reachable through opt-in network features (their own vulnerabilities belong with their maintainers).
  • Findings that require physical or root access to the machine already holding the case database.
  • Denial of service against yourself (e.g., attaching a pathological file to your own case).

Hardening facts maintainers should keep true

  • Network is off by default; TRACEFIELD_ALLOW_NETWORK=1 plus an explicit --fetch/check flag are both required, and the SSRF policy is re-evaluated per request and per redirect.
  • At rest: data directories 0700, database 0600, evidence copies 0400.
  • All external strings are sanitized before terminal rendering; JSON output is escaped by json.dumps.
  • Catalogue content is inert data; nothing in registry/ may import or execute catalogue-supplied content.
  • CI runs the security regression suite (pytest -m security) and pip-audit --strict; a red gate is a signal, not noise.

Supported versions

Only the latest release on main receives security fixes. There are no long-term support branches at this stage of the project.

There aren't any published security advisories