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From Dmitry: "Implement the duplex interface using the Blake2s/2b hash/compression functions . Support long absorb-squeeze patterns. Optimize for the total compression function calls. Prefer a construction yielding 128 bits of provable security in the [CO25] or [SAFE] paradigms"
I'd like to help with this on main, but I first want to understand what is left.
As far as I can tell from git, the issue is older than main's current transcript. #552, #607 and #620 reworked the BLAKE2s one on riscv-exploration, and main got its Keccak-f[1600] duplex later, in #636. Since Nov 9 there is also formal/. As I read formal/statement.tex, it proves knowledge soundness of a Lean transcription of the verifier in the random-permutation model, duplex included (LeanVM.knowledgeSoundness_holds), and the Rust is tied to that transcription by differential tests. Does that close this issue for main? Or is it about riscv-exploration's transcript?
Two notes from reading the transcript:
The duplex has one non-injectivity. A permutation forced by a fifth absorbed scalar is the same permutation as a challenge drawn with four scalars waiting. I brute-forced all operation sequences up to length 11 and found no other. The Lean handles it by decoding each permutation from the verifier program's position (formal/lean_vm/LeanVM/Protocol/Compile/Rom/Decode.lean), but the spec's §8 doesn't mention it. Would a sentence there be welcome?
formal/statement.tex lists programs that evaluate their own proof's Fiat-Shamir duplex (the KRS25 setting) and soundness across recursion levels as not proved. The deployed guest does evaluate Keccak-f, including to recompute its children's challenges. KRS25's attack runs GKR, with no committed trace, over a circuit general enough to compute the hash. leanVM's uncommitted-trace GKRs are the bus's grand products, which their Remark 3 sets aside, and the Keccak-f circuit, which commits a state every 12 rounds. If it would help, I can write up how far their attack is from that.
Last, which construction was the original concern about: #523's step on riscv-exploration, main's BLAKE2s chain at the time, or duplex challengers in general?
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kevaundray commentedon Oct 7, 2026
From Dmitry: "Implement the duplex interface using the Blake2s/2b hash/compression functions . Support long absorb-squeeze patterns. Optimize for the total compression function calls. Prefer a construction yielding 128 bits of provable security in the [CO25] or [SAFE] paradigms"
contrib: draft PR description for option A of leanEthereum#529
contrib: leanEthereum#529 notes revised after an adversarial review
contrib: leanEthereum#529 notes after a second review
contrib: leanEthereum#529 notes after a third review
contrib: the analysis's code links are full permalinks
contrib: the leanEthereum#529 comment links the analysis
mal1keth commentedon Nov 11, 2026
I'd like to help with this on
main, but I first want to understand what is left.As far as I can tell from git, the issue is older than
main's current transcript. #552, #607 and #620 reworked the BLAKE2s one onriscv-exploration, andmaingot its Keccak-f[1600] duplex later, in #636. Since Nov 9 there is alsoformal/. As I readformal/statement.tex, it proves knowledge soundness of a Lean transcription of the verifier in the random-permutation model, duplex included (LeanVM.knowledgeSoundness_holds), and the Rust is tied to that transcription by differential tests. Does that close this issue formain? Or is it aboutriscv-exploration's transcript?Two notes from reading the transcript:
formal/lean_vm/LeanVM/Protocol/Compile/Rom/Decode.lean), but the spec's §8 doesn't mention it. Would a sentence there be welcome?formal/statement.texlists programs that evaluate their own proof's Fiat-Shamir duplex (the KRS25 setting) and soundness across recursion levels as not proved. The deployed guest does evaluate Keccak-f, including to recompute its children's challenges. KRS25's attack runs GKR, with no committed trace, over a circuit general enough to compute the hash. leanVM's uncommitted-trace GKRs are the bus's grand products, which their Remark 3 sets aside, and the Keccak-f circuit, which commits a state every 12 rounds. If it would help, I can write up how far their attack is from that.Last, which construction was the original concern about: #523's step on
riscv-exploration,main's BLAKE2s chain at the time, or duplex challengers in general?Notes, with the brute force and the measurements: mal1keth/leanVM
.contrib/529-analysis.md