Use GitHub's private advisory form: https://github.com/manuc66/TranscribeCppSharp/security/advisories/new.
Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Include the package and
version (TranscribeCppSharp, TranscribeCppSharp.Native.<rid>, the CLI or the
server), the platform, and the smallest reproduction you have.
This repository is a packaging and binding layer over transcribe.cpp. In scope: the C# wrapper, the generated interop bindings, the CLI, the desktop app, the experimental HTTP server, the packaging and the release workflow.
Not this project's code: the native library and ggml. A crash or a wrong
result inside decoding or inference belongs upstream; it will be relayed and the
pin in build/TRANSCRIBE_VERSION bumped, but the fix is theirs.
Not sandboxed: model files. They come from the user or from HuggingFace (pinned revision, sha256 verified before the file enters the cache), and they are parsed by the native library in this process. A malicious GGUF is a native-code trust decision, not something the wrapper can contain.
- Native release archives are pinned by sha256 (
build/native-sha256.json) and the installed files are re-hashed before tests and packing (build/native-libs-sha256.json,FetchNative --verify). - Model downloads are pinned to a revision and verified against the LFS sha256 before they are moved into the cache.
- The workflows pin every action by commit sha, default to
contents: read, and run gitleaks over the full history.
The generator (src/Generator) and the two build tools (tools/FetchNative,
tools/UpdateModelManifest) run against a checkout, on a developer's machine or
in CI. Their inputs are repository paths, and each refuses a path that resolves
outside the directory it owns (src/Shared/BuildPath.cs): the generator and the
manifest tool are confined to the repository root, FetchNative to
native-packages/ — the tree it deletes recursively when the pin moves.
CHeaderDoc and RustFfiParser take header text rather than paths, so reading
the checkout is the caller's job and the parsers stay text transforms.
PcmExtensions.ReadWavToPcm(string) is different by design: a library reads the
file its caller names, and the caller already holds whatever filesystem rights
the process has, so there is no privilege boundary for a path check to enforce.
The CLI passes the file named on its command line; the server never passes user
input there, because an upload is staged to a private temporary file first.
There is no bug bounty and no third-party audit. Nothing here is claimed to be thread-safe, memory-safe or leak-free beyond what the tests and the ABI checks establish. If something is unknown, it is written down as unknown.