Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Send a private report to the repository maintainers with:
- the affected version and macOS/Android versions;
- reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept;
- expected impact;
- any suggested mitigation.
Please allow 90 days for coordinated remediation before public disclosure.
SWIFT accepts untrusted traffic from the local network. Every inbound frame, device name, file name, declared size, and payload is treated as attacker controlled.
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UKEY2 establishes per-transfer keys and a verification PIN.
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The user must verify the PIN and accept each transfer. Device names are not identities and never authorize automatic acceptance.
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Incoming lengths and collection counts are bounded before allocation.
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Received names are reduced to safe leaf names and cannot choose a directory.
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Files are written to temporary names and moved into place only after success.
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URLs and text are saved as files; SWIFT never opens received content.
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The optional localhost control API is disabled by default and token protected.
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Clipboard sync is off until enabled. The listener accepts only private LAN addresses, on Wi-Fi or Ethernet. A phone that knows the 8-digit code can pair. A phone that does not is refused until the person at the Mac taps Allow. The pairing QR carries that code, not the long-lived token. Only a paired phone that then presents the token can replace the Mac pasteboard. Payloads are size-capped. File names cannot choose a directory. The copied text is not written to the system log.
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The iPhone photo page is served only to a private address, and only with a 128-bit token from the QR code on the Android screen. Uploaded names cannot choose a directory. The page does not accept a public-network peer.
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Finder Share cannot open LAN sockets from its sandbox. It hands selected files to the running app over
127.0.0.1and a shared secret. The listener rejects non-loopback peers. The secret is compile-time because the extension has no App Group; any local process that extracts it can ask the app to send files the app can read to a currently visible device. -
Nearby phones are remembered on this Mac as a self-reported name and the phone's Wi-Fi hardware address, so a phone that hides its name keeps a label. That name is only a label. It never skips the PIN or consent.
SWIFT does not provide anonymity, protection from a compromised endpoint, or a trusted persistent identity for native Quick Share peers.
Security fixes are provided for the latest published release. Until a signed and notarized release exists, all builds are development previews.